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The general plan of rehabilitation doctrine pro-
vides that expenses incurred as part of a plan of
general rehabilitation must be capitalized even
though the same expenses incurred separately
would be deductible as ordinary and necessary
repairs. The emerging general standard after IN-
DOPCO for current deduction of an expenditure
with future benefits, the case with most repair/
improvement expenditures, is a balancing test:
Whether the taxpayer ’s administrative and record
keeping costs associated with capitalization out-
weigh the potential distortion of income from a cur-
rent deduction of the future benefit expenditures.
“Rough justice” rules for current deduction of future
benefits expenditures, reflecting that balancing stan-
dard, include whether (1) the expenditure is relative-
ly small or the future benefit is “incidental” to the
current benefit, (2) the expenditures are regularly
recurring, (3) future benefits are short-term or vari-
able, and (4) the burdens of capitalization outweigh
in general the revenue benefits to the Treasury from
capitalization of the expenditure; for example,
wh ere the cost  once capitalized may not  be
depreciated or depreciated only over a period longer
than the expected future benefit (slow or no
depreciation). The Service and courts often have in-
correctly relied on the general plan of rehabilitation
to capitalize post-INDOPCO repair or improvement
costs, where one of these rough justice exceptions to
capitalization should have been used.
This article maintains that the only sound basis for
the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine is the rule
of tax parity or horizontal equity, viz., equivalent treat-
ment between a taxpayer who purchases a business
asset and one who constructs it herself. Thus, a tax-
payer who rehabilitates a run-down building should
be treated the same as a taxpayer who purchases a
renovated similar building. Applying this analysis this
article discusses (1) the inapplicability of the general
plan of rehabilitation doctrine to assets other than the
particular asset being improved; (2) unavailability of
depreciation or too slow depreciation as a basis for
currently deducting remediation costs to avoid the
distortion of income that would arise from no or too
slow depreciation, so that a current deduction should
be allowed, notwithstanding a concurrent general plan
of rehabilitation under the “reverse” rule of tax parity;
(3) such distortion of income reasoning does not apply
where remediation is anticipated at time of purchase
since the acquisition cost doctrine would then apply
(under a rule of tax parity reasoning although not so
articulated in the case law), even in the absence of a
general plan of rehabilitation; (4) a minimum distor-
tion of income analysis of repair versus improvement
expenditures; (5) where cyclical repairs occur more
frequently than the recovery period of the repaired
asset, the cost of the repairs should be treated as a
freestanding intangible and depreciated over the
recurrence period or currently deductible if sufficient-
ly insubstantial or short or variable term, or no or only
slow depreciation would be available if capitalized;
and (6) where those repairs occur in a cycle substan-
tially identical to the recovery period of the repaired
asset, their cost should be capitalized and depreciated
over that recovery period to avoid distortion of in-
come. 
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I. Introduction
Cases, rulings, commentary, and news reports1
evidence that revenue agents frequently rely in audit
on the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine, which
provides that expenses incurred as part of a plan of
general rehabilitation must be capitalized even though
the same expenses if incurred separately, would be
deductible as ordinary and necessary.2 Such reliance
appears due to the possibility of thereby (1) bypassing
the “restorative principle” of Plainfield Union,3 which
permits current deduction under section 162 of the
costs of repairs that merely restore property to its con-
dition before the event necessitating the repair (or per-
haps before the taxpayer’s discovery of the potential
effects of such event); and (2) lumping together a num-
ber of expenditures without having to analyze whether
capitalization under section 263 or a current deduction
of each expenditure under section 162 would produce
less distortion of the taxpayer ’s income.
Part IV.C of this article shows that the emerging
general standard after INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,4
for current deduction of an expenditure with future
benefits, the case with most repair/improvement ex-
penditures, is a balancing test: Whether the taxpayer’s
“administrative and recordkeeping costs associated
with capitalization” outweigh “the potential distortion
of income” from currently deducting those future bene-
fit expenditures.5 “Rough justice”6 rules for current
deduction of future benefits expenditures, explicitly or
implicitly based on such a balancing standard, include
whether (1) the future benefit from the expenditures
does not last for more than 12 months, (2) the expen-
diture is relatively small or the future benefit is “in-
cidental” to the current benefit, (3) the expenditures
are regularly recurring, (4) future benefits are short-
term or variable, or (5) the burdens of capitalization
outweigh in general the revenue benefits to the Trea-
sury from capitalization of the expenditure; for ex-
ample, where the cost once capitalized may not be
depreciated or depreciated only over a period longer
than the expected future benefit (slow or no deprecia-
tion).7 If one or more of these rules apply to the expen-
ditures by the taxpayer, their current deduction con-
stitutes a method of tax accounting meeting the clear
reflection of income mandate of section 446(a).8 The
existing repair versus improvement rules in general
G. Norwest Corp. and Economic
Inefficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
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1E.g., FSA 200202026, Doc 2002-826 (5 original pages), 2002
TNT 9-88; Rev. Rul. 2001-4, 2001-3 IRB 295, Doc 2001-57 (19
original pages), 2000 TNT 247-5; Vanalco Inc. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1999-265, Doc 1999-26420 (24 original pages), 1999
TNT 152-76, aff’d sub nom. Smith v. Commissioner, 300 F.3rd
1023, Doc 2002-18762 (26 original pages), 2002 TNT 157-6 (9th
Cir. 2002) (the Ninth Circuit in affirming the Tax Court on this
issue did not discuss the general plan of rehabilitation yet it
did as to another issue); Glenn Carrington, “Capitalization
After INDOPCO and Into the New Millennium,” Tax Notes,
Nov. 5, 2001, p. 813; “Transcript of Sixth Invitational Biennial
Conference on Tax Legislative Process, Day Two,” 2001 TNT
160-17 para. 504 (Aug. 17, 2001); Lee A. Sheppard, “News
Analysis, The INDOPCO Grocery List,” Tax Notes, Oct. 15,
2001, p. 320.
2See notes 22-25 infra and accompanying text.
3Plainfield Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 338
(1962), nonacq. 1964-2 C.B. 8.
4INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 86-7, 92 TNT
44-1 (1992), rejected the rule that an expenditure not creating
or enhancing a separate asset was per se currently deductible,
in favor of a rule that an expenditure generating more than
“incidental” future benefits should be capitalized to match
the expense with these future benefits.
5“Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures,” 67
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (Jan. 24, 2002) (Advance Notice); U.S.
Freightways Corp v. Commissioner, 270 F.3rd 1137, 1146, Doc
2001-27961 (9 original pages), 2001 TNT 217-14 (7th Cir. 2001)
(gain in precision for the taxing authorities from a more per-
fect matching of expense and income is outweighed by the
administrative burden the taxpayer would bear in such
matching); see generally John Lee, Eldridge Blanton, Veena
Luthra, Glenn Walberg, and Darryl Whitesell, “Restating Cap-
italization Standards and Rules: The Case for Rough Justice
Regulations (Part One),” 23 Ohio Northern U. L. Rev. 631, 647-
48 (1997) (Lee, et al., Rough Justice I). This article and (Part
Two) 23 Ohio Northern University Law Review 1483 (1997) (Lee,
et al., Rough Justice II) are a polished version of my students’
and my submission to the Service in response to Notice 96-7,
1996-1 C.B. 359, Doc 96-1983 (2 pages), 96 TNT 13-5.
6See note 106 infra.
7See note 108-117 infra and accompanying text. Other
rough justice rules, which rarely if ever apply to repairs in
the context of the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine,
include (1) allocation of the expenditure between current and
future benefits is difficult and (2) future benefits are specula-
tive. I discuss all of these rough justice rules in more detail
in “Transaction Costs Relating to the Acquisition or Enhan-
cement of Intangible Property: A Populist, Political, But Prac-
tical Perspective,” forthcoming in the Fall 2002 issue of Vir-
ginia Tax Review.
8Section 446(a) and (b) provides that the taxpayer ’s in-
come is to be computed under her regular method of account-
ing unless she fails to employ a method or the method used
does not clearly reflect income. In either case, income will be
computed under such method as does clearly reflect income
in the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. Capital-
ization, depreciation, and clear reflection of income are “in-
extricably intertwined,” with the ultimate question being the
success of the taxpayer ’s method of tax accounting in clearly
reflecting income. Cincinnati, N.O., Tex. & Pac. RR v. United
States, 424 F.2d 563, 569 (Ct. Cl.1970) (relying on Fort Howard
Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967)); accord
Advance Notice, supra note 5 at 3462 (“A fundamental pur-
pose of section 263(a) is to prevent the distortion of taxable
income through current deduction of expenditures relating
to the production of income in future taxable years.”). A
(Footnote 8 continued on next page.)
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only imperfectly correspond with the above general
rough justice exceptions.9 Moreover, to date the Service
and the courts have overly and often incorrectly relied
on the general plan of rehabilitation to capitalize post-
INDOPCO repair or improvement costs where one of
the rough justice exceptions to capitalization should
have been used.10
Treasury and the Service’s 2002 “Guidance Regard-
ing Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures”11
announced that the IRS and Treasury Department were
considering separate guidance to address costs to
repair or improve tangible property. Revenue Ruling
2001-412 is the Service’s prior guidance as to the general
plan of rehabilitation. Unfortunately, while ably
describing factors present in the case law, that ruling
fails to use a balancing-standard minimum distortion
of income13 analysis as to either the doctrine or more
significantly to cyclical expenses. This article asserts
that this failure has lead to some erroneous con-
clusions, or at least reasoning, in the ruling as well as
in the post-INDOPCO repair/improvement case law.14
Furthermore, the ruling is not easily administrable; it
does not define “‘significant portion,’ ‘substantial
structural part,’  ‘major component,’ or ‘material
upgrade or addition,’”15 on which its holdings turn.
We hope the guidance as to repairs versus improve-
ments being considered will explicitly adopt such a
balancing of burdens to taxpayer (or possibly to the
government) with the benefits of more exact matching
of expense and income standard, as does the “Advance
Notice.” Properly applying this balancing standard,
such regulations would not incorporate the existing
general plan of rehabilitation conceptual errors as
Revenue Ruling 2001-4 does.16 At the same time ideally
taxpayer ’s practice of capitalizing or expensing certain items
constitutes a method of accounting. E.g., Rev. Rul. 95-74,
1995-2 C.B. 36, Doc 95-9854 (10 pages), 95 TNT 212-35; Rev.
Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8, Doc 95-3224; 95 TNT 59-14; GCM
39,328 (Jan. 23, 1985).
9See note 61 infra. Some repair decisions seem to treat lack
of permanence [which implies a recurring expenditure] as an
independent factor. American Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner,
10 T.C. 361, 377, aff ’d 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1948). Conversely,
a very large and infrequent expenditure incurred in construct-
ing a sea wall and raising drilling platforms to preserve
existing offshore oil drilling operations was capitalized and
depreciated over the 30-year recurrence cycle in TAM
9424002, 94 TNT 118-12.
“[E]xpenditures which are substantial in relation to the
value of an asset cannot be characterized as ‘incidental’
repairs.” Mary Lou Hopun, Note, “To Expense or to Capital-
ize? The Impact of Federal Income Tax Treatment of Environ-
mental Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA,” 19 U. Dayton L. Rev.
679, 703 (1984); Stoeltzing v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374 (3rd
Cir. 1959) (building repair costs capitalized because they ex-
ceeded 200 percent of original cost). Conversely replacement
of a small portion of a pipeline was held deductible in Badger
Pipe Line v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-457, Doc 97-28098
(13 pages), 97 TNT 196-9. Nevertheless, contrary decisions as
to the significance of large expenditures include American
Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 360 (1948), aff ’d 177 F.2d
200 (6th Cir. 1949), and Buckland v. United States, 66 F. Supp.
681 (D. Conn. 1946). Hence, conventional wisdom holds that
“cost alone is not dispositive.” Rev. Rul. 2001-4, note 1 supra.
The repair “increase in value” factor roughly corresponds
with future benefit, although an expenditure may increase
the property in value without increasing its useful life. Early
on the courts pointed out that most repairs result in an in-
crease in value. Black Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A.
55, 553-541 (B.T.A. 1929) (“it seems unreasonable that a build-
ing so located as to be free from the menace of storms and
floods is not more valuable than the same building, or the
same kind of building, not so favorably situated.”), aff’d 39
F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1939), cert. denied 282 U.S. 841 (1939). How-
ever, the Tax Court has said that while it “is true that most
cases which have held expenditures to be deductible repairs
have relied upon the fact that the work did not result in an
increase in the valuation or prolongation of useful life, . . .
this does not mean that unless there is an increase in value
or useful life the expenditure cannot be a capital expense.”
Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1222
(1965).
The “restoration” principle, see notes 83-97 infra and ac-
companying text, does not fit into a future benefits, rough
justice exceptions model.
10See notes 142-44, 149-54 infra and accompanying text.
1167 Fed. Reg. 3461 (Jan. 24, 2002). Advance Notice, note 5
supra at 3462, addresses only “the application of section 263(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code to expenditures that result in
taxpayers acquiring, creating, or enhancing intangible assets
or benefits.” The IRS’s “2000 Priorities for Tax Regulations and
Other Administrative Guidance” (March 21, 2000), Doc 2000-
8725 (29 original pages), 2000 TNT 56-18, had provided the
following examples of capitalization/expensing areas where
“guidance” (in form of rulings) might be provided: “cyclical
maintenance costs, sales commissions paid to obtain new cus-
tomers, mutual fund launch costs, and loan origination costs.”
See also “TEI Suggests Guidance on Capitalization,” Doc 2000-
7609 (7 original pages), 2000 TNT 57-30.
12Note 1 supra.
13For discussion of that standard, see note 99 infra and
accompanying text.
14See notes 180-84 infra and accompanying text.
15FSA 200202026, note 1 supra (“Some of the terminology
used in the ruling (i.e., ‘significant portion,’ ‘substantial
structural part,’ ‘major component,’ or ‘material upgrade or
addition’) is undefined. Pending clarification of these terms,
this document is intended to provide guidance to examiners
on the efficient use of time and resources in the examination
of this issue. Based on the ruling, the commitment of staffing
to examine airframes, which underwent the first or second
HMV, is usually not an effective utilization of those re-
sources. . . . At the beginning of an examination, you should
contact the Air Transportation Technical Advisor group and
obtain a listing of the taxpayer ’s fleet composition. . . . This
list can be shared with the taxpayer and used to confirm the
type and age of their fleet. From this, you will quickly see if
the taxpayer has an aging fleet that would be subject to a
third HMV or a newer one that would not be subject to it. If
they have few aircraft subject to a third HMV, you should
not spend significant resources on this issue.”).
16See notes 181-85 infra and accompanying text.
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES, November 11, 2002 805
they will treat cyclical expenditures in accordance with
the above rough justice rules.
Part III of this article maintains that the only sound
basis for the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine is
the “rule of parity,” viz., equivalent treatment between
a taxpayer who purchases a business asset and one who
constructs it herself.17 Thus, if a taxpayer purchasing
an asset may not treat a particular expenditure (such
as a repair-like expenditure) separately from the pur-
chased asset, a taxpayer constructing an identical asset
herself may not treat such an expenditure separately
either. The best illustration is that a taxpayer who
rehabilitates a rundown building should be treated the
same as a taxpayer who purchases a renovated similar
building.
Part IV discusses (1) the inapplicability of the gen-
eral plan of rehabilitation doctrine to assets other than
the particular asset being improved, now accepted by
the Service;18 (2) unavailability of depreciation or too
slow depreciation as a basis for currently deducting
remediation costs to avoid the distortion of income that
would arise from no or too slow depreciation, so that
a current deduction should be allowed, notwithstand-
ing a concurrent general plan of rehabilitation under
the “reverse” rule of tax parity; (3) inapplicability of
such distortion of income reasoning where remediation
is anticipated at time of purchase since the acquisition
cost doctrine would then apply (under a rule of tax
parity reasoning although not so articulated in the case
law), even in the absence of a general plan of rehabilita-
tion; (4) a minimum distortion of income analysis of
repair versus improvement expenditures; (5) when
cyclical repairs occur more frequently than the
recovery period of the repaired asset, how the cost of
the repairs should be treated as a freestanding intan-
gible and depreciated over the recurrence period or
currently deductible if sufficiently insubstantial or
short or variable term, or no or only slow depreciation
would be available if capitalized; and (6) where the
repairs occur in a cycle substantially identical to the
recovery period of the repaired asset, how their cost
should be capitalized and depreciated over the
recovery period to avoid distortion of income.19
Any proposed repair versus improvement capital-
ization regulations should present the policy basis for
the general plan of rehabilitation (buttressed in the
preamble with citation to supporting substantial au-
thorities, much like the Advance Notice);20 and then
illustrate application of this policy to numerous factual
variations, much like the excellent revised section 355
regulations.21
II. Conventional Wisdom
The “general plan of rehabilitation,” a judicial
doctrine originating in the Tax Court, traditionally
holds that “[e]xpenses incurred as part of a plan of
general rehabilitation must be capitalized even though
the same expenses if incurred separately would be de-
ductible as ordinary and necessary.”22 The doctrine
focuses on the results of the work performed and the
substance of the overall transaction, rather than on the
steps taken in the process.23 It uses four factors: (1)
whether there has been an increase in the fair market
value of the property; and (2) the purpose; (3) nature;
and (4) extent of the work.24 In short, if repairs that
standing alone could qualify for a current deduction
constitute, when viewed together, an integrated plan
to increase the useful life or value of an asset or adapt
it to another use, they are capitalized to the tax cost or
basis of that asset.25 Some early authorities rest the
general plan of rehabilitation doctrine on a principle
of no fragmentation of expenditures.
The Code . . . does not does not envision the frag-
mentation of an over-all project for deduction for
capitalization purposes. . . . The construction of a
new building encompasses numerous steps,
many of which, when viewed alone, might in the
everyday, commonly accepted sense, be con-
17See notes 38-43 infra and accompanying text.
18Rev. Rul. 2001-4, note 1 supra, citing Moss v. Commissioner,
831 F.2d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1987).
19See notes 100-13 infra and accompanying text.
2067 Fed. Reg. at 3462-64 (frequent citations); Lee, et al.,
Rough Justice I, supra note 5 at 664 (“This article recommends
that at the least the Service and Treasury issue ‘interpretative’
regulations, providing substantive guidance as to capital-
ization along the above ‘rough justice’ lines, with numerous
examples drawn from the judicial and Service rulings. . . .
Professor Lawrence Lokken describes this approach as
‘rough cut’ or common-law regulations.”).
21John W. Lee, “The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured
Discretionary Justice Under Section 355,” Tax Notes, Aug. 28,
1989, p. 1029 at 1037-45; Lee, et al., Rough Justice II, supra note
5 at 1484. The “Art of Regulation Drafting” article also tells
the story of how John W. Lee, “Functional Divisions and Other
Corporate Separations Under Section 355 After Rafferty,” 27
Tax L. Rev. 453-98 (1972), served as the conceptual framework
for these regulations. See also GCMs 36,387 (Aug. 25, 1975) and
36,069 (Nov. 5, 1974).
22Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 265, 280, 285, Doc
97-11771 (81 pages), 97 TNT 82-8 (1997). The genesis of the
doctrine is Cowell v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 997 (1930); United
States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968), is the most
frequently cited authority in this area.
23J. Wendell Bayles and Clair R. Rich, “Repair or Capital
Expenditure: The Tenth Circuit’s General Plan of Betterment
Rule,” 1974 Utah L. Rev. 272, 283.
24Wehrli, note 22 supra at 690; Rev. Rul 2002-4, note 1 supra;
see generally Hopun, note 9 supra at 701-03; Jeffrey M. Gaba,
“Tax Deduction of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: Har-
monizing Federal Tax and Environmental Policies,” 20 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 61, 85 (1996); Christine Black, Comment,
“Saving the Green: Who Should Pay for Environmental
Cleanup Costs?” 20 J. of Corp’n Law 671, 676 n.39 (1995); Brian
Pavano, Note, “Life in All Its Fullness: A Discussion of Cap-
italization v. Deduction,” 39 B.C. L. Rev. 253, 267 (1997).
25See Steven G. Black, Note, “The Continuing Saga of En-
vironmental Cleanup Costs: Current Deduction Allowed
Under the Restoration Principle of Plainfield Union,” 1995
BYU L. Rev. 1321, 1324.
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sidered repair items. But, taken as a whole, the
cost of construction is capitalized.26
Over time and with no recognition by the general
plan of rehabilitation authorities, this no fragmentation
notion came to be conceptually undercut by allowance
under section 167 of “component depreciation,” which
in fact does break down or fragment for depreciation
purposes components of real estate construction or
purchased used real estate improvements if supported
by appraisals of the components.27 (Although com-
ponent depreciation is prohibited by section 168 as to
real estate improvements, with lengthening of the
recovery period and elimination of accelerated
depreciation as to nonresidential real estate improve-
ments, that prohibition no longer seems that ap-
propriate.)28 Furthermore, the reasonable allowance for
depreciation of short-lived components equivalent to
repairs should be a current deduction.29 Moreover, the
Tax Court on occasion has separated ordinary from
capital expenditures using a Cohan equitable ap-
proximation while at the same time rejecting the Com-
missioner ’s broad-brush application of the general rule
of rehabilitation.30
In Cowell,31 the progenitor of the doctrine, the Board
of Tax Appeals (predecessor to the Tax Court) rested
on the impracticality of separating ordinary from capital
expenditures in a large-scale rehabilitation,32 which,
however, component depreciation demonstrates is not
the case. The Tax Court in Bloomfield Steamship Co. v.
26Bank of Houston v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1960-110;
accord TAM 9547002, 95 TNT 230-10.
27Shainberg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 241 (1959) (component
depreciation permitted as to newly constructed shopping
center), acq. 1960-1 C.B. 5; Rev. Rul. 68-4, 1968-1 C.B. 77
(newly constructed property); Rev. Rul. 73-410, 1973-2 C.B.
53 (component deprecation can used as to used property
where supported by qualified appraisals), considered in GCM
35,322 (Apr. 27, 1973). See generally John W. Lee, “Start-Up
Costs, Section 195 and Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of
Talismans, Tacked on Tax Reform and a Touch of Basics,” 6
Va. Tax Rev. 1, 34-6 (1986) (Lee, Start Up Costs); Lee, et al.,
Rough Justice II, supra note 5 at 1554-56.
28Section 168(f)(1). This was sound policy under ERTA
when the recovery period for real estate improvements was
15 years and the aggregate average component life for real
estate improvements was 35 years. Over the years the vary-
ing recovery periods for real estate improvements under sec-
tion 168 reflect at each turn political deals. The increase in
the recovery period for real estate improvements from 15
years to 18 years in 1984 was a compromise instead of 20
years with the difference in revenues “paid for” in revenue
scoring by changes to installment reporting (section 453(i)
taxing all depreciation recapture in the year of sale). Daniel
Bernick, “Real Estate Write-Off Change Approved by Finance
Amidst Disagreements Within Industry,” Tax Notes, Apr. 9,
1984, p. 117 at 119. This favored factory owners and realtors
over real estate developers who tend more to churn. Id; “How
the Options Industry and Realtors Escaped the Tax Bill’s
Axe,” 84 TNT 153-22. The increase in the recovery period in
1993 from 31 years to 39 years for nonresidential real estate
improvements was to pay for the section 469(c)(7) real estate
operator exception to PAL. “Unofficial Transcript of May 11
IRS Hearing on Passive Activity Losses” (May 11, 1995)
(Statement of Toby Bradley, representing National Associa-
tion of Realtors), Doc 95-2863 (46 pages), 95 TNT 97-37.) Today
the recovery period for nonresidential real estate at least is
too short compared to economic depreciation. Treasury
Department, Report to  the Congress on Depreciation
Recovery Periods and Methods paras. 16, 287, 288 (July 28,
2000).
29See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 27 at 50 n.219 (explicat-
ing Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 433-34 n.9 (1980), aff’d
mem. 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982). Goodwin approved the result,
but not the reasoning, in United States v. Manor Care, Inc., 490
F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980). Manor Care allowed a current
deduction in the first tax year a new business began to func-
tion as a going concern for expenditures paid earlier in the
same year, but before the taxpayer ’s both obtaining a license
to operate and operating the business. Id. at 362. In Goodwin
the Tax Court disagreed with the Manor Care reasoning that
the expenditures were deductible under section 162, on the
ground they “were clearly pre-operating in nature.” 75 T.C. at
433-34 n.8. Instead, Goodwin indicated the identical result of a
current deduction could be reached by capitalizing the expen-
ditures and then allowing — once the business began — amor-
tization deductions over the period benefitted. Id. Further, the
Tax Court implicitly reasoned that the period benefitted by
such recurring pre-operating costs was a year or less; there-
fore, the “reasonable allowance” in the year the business com-
menced for depreciation of such capitalized pre-operating
costs was the entire cost. See Marla A. Schuster, “Pre-Opening
Costs — Recent Legislative and Judicial Attention,” Tax.
Mgmt. Mem. No. 81-8 (BNA) 3, 5-6 (1981)).
30Churchill Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-
192, aff ’d on this ground sub nom. Bayou Verret Land Co. v.
Commissioner, 450 F.2d 850, 858 (5th Cir. 1971). Cohan v. Com-
missioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), pronounced a rule of
equitable approximation under which the predecessor to the
Tax Court was required to approximate the amount of an
expenditure if the taxpayer proved that she had incurred
some amount. See Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 27 at 39-40;
Lee, et al., Rough Justice II, supra note 5 at 1554-56 (where
intangible is wasting Cohan approximation is required by
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O’Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 135, 138
(8th Cir. 1960)).
31Cowell v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 997, 1000 (1930).
32While the characterization of some of the items is
such that standing alone or made as periodic repairs
they might be deductible as ordinary and necessary
expenses, it is impractical from the evidence to make
such a detailed classification of the items. . . . To fix a
door or patch plaster might very well be treated as an
expense when it is an incidental minor item arising in
the use of the property in carrying on business, and
yet, as here, be properly capitalized when involved in
a greater plan of rehabilitation, enlargement and im-
provement of the entire property.
Id. at 1000. See Pasquale Sommella, Note and Comment,
“Revenue Ruling 94-38: The Uncertainty Continues — A Look
at Using the Tax Code to Effectuate Environmental Remedia-
tion,” 13 Pace Envt’l L. Rev. 345, 376 (1995).
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Commissioner33 linked the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine with the regulatory proviso that deductible
repairs be incidental.34
“Incidental” imports that the repairs be necessary
to some other action. . . . Deductible repair ex-
penses are those incidental to maintaining busi-
ness property, incidental to the keeping of the
property in “an ordinarily efficient operating con-
dition.” Repairs incidental to capital expendi-
tures  for remodeling or renovation of the
property are not deductible.35
“Incidental” here is more a conclusion than a rationale.
Ironically, the easiest to administer rule for repairs has
been recognized for at least three decades36 as a “repair
allowance percentage,” under the “asset depreciation
range” regulations,37 for example, percentage of unad-
justed basis, which arguably could and should be
adopted in any proposed repair versus improvement
regulations. (Then, after these proposals have under-
gone public scrutiny and the competition of ideas in
the legislative marketplace, Congress could codify the
regulations as it often has in the past, for example,
family partnership and Clifford trust regulations, later
the section 305 disproportionate stock distributions
regulations, and in the closest analogy the post-facto
statutory authorization for the “asset depreciation
range” regulations.)
III. Rule of Tax Parity
The only defensible rationale for the general plan of
rehabilitation doctrine is the “rule of parity,” under
which the tax treatment of a facility by a taxpayer who
constructs or reconstructs her own business facilities
and by one who hires an independent contractor (or
purchases the facility turnkey from an unrelated party
at fair market value) should be substantially the same.38
The rule of parity rests on the fundamental tax policy
of horizontal equity under which similarly situated
taxpayers should be taxed the same in similar transac-
tions.39 Justice Blackmun’s insight in Commissioner v.
Idaho Power Co.40 that a taxpayer self-constructing a
plant ought not be tax advantaged over a taxpayer
purchasing a plant or hiring an independent contractor
to perform the construction work is bottomed on the
rule of tax parity.41 In that case Justice Blackmun (who
not coincidentally was the author of INDOPCO)42 re-
3333 T.C. 75, 84 (1959), aff’d per curiam 285 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.
1961).
34Treas. reg. section 1.162-4. Since 1918 the business ex-
pense regulations’ test for a currently deductible “repair” has
been an incidental expenditure which neither appreciably
extends the life nor increases the value of property, but keeps
it in efficient operating condition. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 103
(1918). See generally Black, Continuing Saga, note 25 supra at
1324-25; Roy Whitehead, et al., “The IRS Plows New Ground
in the Tax Treatment of Land Cleanup Costs,” 48 Okla L. Rev.
417, 423 (1995).
35Bloomfield Steamship, note 33 supra.
36John Lee, “Doping Out the Capitalization Rules after
INDOPCO,” 57 Tax Notes, Nov. 2, 1992, p. 669 at 684 (Lee,
Capitalization Rules); accord Amy Hamilton, “Treasury Offi-
cial Assesses INDOPCO Coalition Proposal,” Tax Notes, Nov.
5, 2001, p. 745 at 748 (“The administration has expressed an
interest in the coalition’s repair allowance proposals, [Chris-
tine M.] Turgeon [, senior tax law specialist in Treasury’s
Office of Tax Policy,] said. The question seems to come down
to the government and coalition negotiating a compromise
on the repair allowance percentages.”); INDOPCO Grocery
List,” note 1 supra, at 323, 325 (Oct. 15, 2001); “INDOPCO
Coalition Proposed Capitalization Principles,” Doc 2001-
26125 (75 original pages), 2001 TNT 198-44 (“If the taxpayer
elects MRAS [Modified Repair Allowance System], expendi-
tures for repair, maintenance, rehabilitation or improvement
of assets that are not Significant Capital Improvements are
currently deductible up to the Repair Allowance for the tax
year as defined in Part IV.B.6. Significant Capital Improve-
ments and expenditures in excess of the Repair Allowance
are capitalized.”).
37See withdrawn Treas. reg. section 1.167-11(d)(2). Profes-
sor Bittker argued that Treasury did not have the authority
(before statutory authorization) to make such “extraordinary
departures [ranges of class lives and ‘repair deduction allow-
ance’ as to rehabilitation and improvement expenditures]
from widely accepted principles regarding the division be-
tween current expenditures and capital items.” Boris I. Bit-
tker, “Treasury Authority to Issue the Proposed ‘Asset
Depreciation Range System’ Regulations,” 49 Taxes 265, 266-
67 (1971). GCM 39,802 (Nov. 1, 1989) and GCM 38,788 (Aug.
26, 1981) reveal that the asset depreciation range regulation’s
rules were not exactly scientifically constructed. See generally
Lee, et al., Rough Justice I, supra note 5 at 673 n. 150 and 690
n. 235.
38Lee, Capitalization Rules, note 36 supra at 677 (citing
California Casket Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 32, 37-8 (1952)
(acquisition of building with express intention of completely
renovating an alternate to conform to specific requirements of
business required capitalization of all integral parts of plan).
39John W. Lee, Glenn Walberg, and Darryl D. Whitesell,
“Capitalizing and Depreciating Cyclical Aircraft Main-
tenance Costs: More-Trouble-Than-It’s-Worth?” 17 Va. Tax
Rev. 161, 220 (1997) (Lee, et al., Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance
Costs). See Joseph T. Sneed, “The Criteria of Federal Income
Tax Policy,” 17 Stanford L. Rev. 567, 575-80 (1965).
40See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 14 (1974)
(capitalization of construction-related depreciation by a tax-
payer doing its own construction work is necessary to main-
tain tax equality with a taxpayer whose construction work is
done by an independent contractor, since depreciation on the
contractor ’s equipment would be an element of her charges,
which would have to be capitalized by the taxpayer for
whom the work was done). The Sixth Circuit similarly
reasoned “that pre-opening expenses must be treated as cap-
ital to maintain parity with a taxpayer whose cost of purchas-
ing an existing business is clearly capital.” Johnsen v. Commis-
sioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir. 1986).
41Pac. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 644 F.2d 1358, 1360
(9th Cir. 1981); Louisville & Nashville RR v. Commissioner, 641
F.2d 435, 440 (6th Cir. 1981); GCM 37,171, pp. 11, 17 (June 20,
1997); Lee, Start-Up Costs, note 27 supra at 34-5; Robert A.
Green, “Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence,” 26
Hastings Const. L. Q. 109, 131-32 (1998) (Green, Blackmun’s
Tax Jurisprudence).
42Green, Blackmun’s Tax Jurisprudence, note 41 supra at
109, 111-13, 124-39 (describing Justice Blackmun’s back-
ground as a tax practitioner, affinity for tax decisions on the
Court while other Justices regarded tax cases as “dogs,” and
his capitalization cases).
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quired capitalization to the basis or cost of a self-
constructed electr ic ity generating plant  of  the
amount of otherwise allowable tax depreciation on the
vehicles the utility company used to transport the con-
struction workers to the very remote job site to main-
tain tax parity between self-construction and purchas-
ing an improvement. The notion is that since a
hypothetical contractor would have included those
costs in her contract price thus affecting the taxpayer ’s
tax cost in the plant, a self-constructing taxpayer
likewise must include that depreciation in her basis in
the plant.43
Two oft-cited general plan of rehabilitation author-
ities in effect bottom the doctrine on tax parity reason-
ing. Jones v. Commissioner44 applied the general plan of
rehabilitation doctrine to the restoration of a historical
building in New Orleans’ French Quarter that was in
complete disrepair.45 Jones reasoned that had the city
permitted the taxpayer to demolish the property as
requested,46 he would have constructed an entirely
new building, the expense of which would not have
been deductible.47 More explicitly, Stoeltzing v. Commis-
sioner48 concluded that the taxpayer “bought an old
building and made a new and different building, com-
mercially useful, out of it.”49
In addition to the foregoing, we are persuaded by
the position of the Tax Court that it is “more
realistic to treat the project as a whole.” If the
expenditure for each item of repair were con-
sidered individually, without relation to other
items, it may be correct to classify some of them
as deductible expenses. But the Tax Court stated,
“we see no justification for making such a sepa-
rate treatment of the items on the record before
us.” The principle is made clear in Jones v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 1957, 242 F.2d
616, 619, quoting 4 Mertens, Federal Taxation, sec-
tion 25.41, wherein it was said: “The difficulty
inherent in determining the character of a par-
ticular expenditure is illustrated by the fact that
a particular item, standing alone or made as pe-
riodic repairs, might be deductible as an ordinary
and necessary business expense, but if made as a
part of an entire capital investment in the im-
proved property, may be treated as a capital ex-
penditure.” If Stoeltzing had erected a completely
new building, items of work which the contractor
might have undertaken to prepare the building for
occupancy such as carting away refuse or painting or
even washing windows, could hardly be separated
from the whole cost and deducted as expenses. Since
the Tax Court found in substance that Stoeltzing
renovated an untenantable building, we can per-
ceive no effective distinction between the circum-
stances of the cited case and those of the case at
bar.50
Jones and Stoeltzing thus in effect rested on a “rule
of tax parity” or horizontal equity between self-
construction and purchase of a new facility. Under
this rule of tax parity, for instance, while replacing
small items alone, such as shingles on a roof or a door,
would be currently deductible, their cost should be
capitalized when part of an owner ’s rehabilitation of a
structure.51 For if these costs were incurred by a con-
tractor in a turnkey project, she would include these
items in her sales price. The costs would then be part
of the purchaser ’s overall cost in the construction
project and be depreciated as part of the improvement
under the composite method.
43Note that section 198, permitting deduction of otherwise
capitalizable environmental remediation costs as to pre-exist-
ing contamination in “brownfield” sites (once limited to “tar-
geted” low-income urban and rural areas, but now extending
to any “qualified contaminated site”), carves out depreciable
assets and costs capitalized under Idaho Power or section 263A.
See generally John W. Lee and W. Eugene Seago, “Policy Entre-
preneurship, Public Choice, and Symbolic Reform Analysis of
Section 198, The Brownfields Tax Incentive; Carrot or Stick or
Just Never Mind?” 26 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 613
(2002).
44242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
45See id. at 617.
46In this case, the taxpayer did not want to make the
repairs. He wished instead to demolish the structure and
rebuild on it. The city, however, refused to allow the taxpayer
to demolish the property because it was considered a histori-
cal building. See id. at 617.
47See id. at 620.
48266 F.2d 374 (3rd Cir. 1959).
49Id. at 375, 377 (taxpayer purchased a “untenatable”
building in “bad state of repair” and “made a new and differ-
ent building, commercially useful, out of it”). Moss v. Com-
missioner, note 18 supra at 839, agreed with the taxpayer that
“every case in which the rehabilitation doctrine has been
applied to date has involved substantial capital improve-
ments and repairs to the same specific asset, usually a struc-
ture in a state of disrepair.” Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-323, Doc 2000-26952 (33 original
pages), 2000 TNT 203-6, thought it significant that the engine
rebuilding at issue was performed at a time when the engine
was completely serviceable. For criticism of this notion see
notes 181-85 infra and accompanying text.
50Stoeltzing, note 48 supra at 377 (emphasis supplied). This
no fragmentation premise is contrary to component deprecia-
tion. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
51Badger Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-457
(“replacement of a small number of slate tiles in a roof . . .
[constitutes] repairs, while . . . a replacement of the roof or a
major portion thereof . . . [is] capital in nature); Crowell, note
22 supra at 1001 (“To fix a door or patch plaster might very
well be treated as an expense when it is an incidental minor
item arising in the use of the property in carrying on busi-
ness, and yet, as here, be properly capitalized when involved
in a greater plan of rehabilitation, enlargement and improve-
ment of the entire property”). Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C.
Summary Opinion 2002-117, Doc 2002-20576 (5 original pages),
2002 TNT 174-10, however, ruled that removing the existing
top layers of a roof in a rental house and recovering it with
fiberglass sheets and hot asphalt at a cost of $8,000 con-
stituted a deductible repair, reasoning that there was “no
replacement or substitution of the roof.” My brother the
roofer would disagree, but then he doesn’t do hot tar roofs,
only shingle roofs. The costs of removal should have been
deductible, but the costs of recovering should have been
capitalized. See reasoning in note 82 infra.
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Reaching a strikingly similar conclusion to the
Stoeltzing general plan of rehabilitation example of
preparing a building for occupancy by “carting away
refuse,” the Tax Court in Shainberg v. Commissioner52
capitalized expenses of cleaning up for the grand open-
ing of a shopping center, implicitly based on the ac-
quisition cost doctrine.53 The origin-of-the-claim or ac-
quisition cost doctrine capitalizes, and adds to the basis
of the asset acquired,54 recurring short-lived costs
(which frequently otherwise would be deductible) in-
curred in connection with the acquisition of an asset
used in the taxpayer ’s business.55 This usage occurs
although identical costs incurred after, and not an-
ticipated at the time of, acquisition are currently
deducted, usually as maintenance costs. Analyzing the
farm preparatory cost doctrine,56 Tax Court Judge
Raum used an example strikingly similar to the classic
replacement of a few shingles or a door illustration of
the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine:
[T]he cost of painting a building . . . generally is
considered a deductible business expense. Yet the
cost of putting the final coat of paint on a building
in the course of construction is plainly a capital
expenditure. Both involve painting and may be
identical in physical character; however, one is
incurred in ordinary maintenance while the other
is one of the components of cost in acquiring a
complete capital asset.57
The general plan of rehabilitation doctrine, the
origin of the claim doctrine, and the acquisition cost
doctrine are all bottomed on the notion that the costs
of acquiring (or the functional equivalent in a substan-
tial rehabilitation) a capital asset must be capitalized
to avoid distortion of income. If a portion of that cost,
52Shainberg, note 27 supra.
53See Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 404 (1965),
aff ’d 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967).
54See John W. Lee and Nina R. Murphy, “Capital Expendi-
tures: A Result in Search of a Rationale,” 15 U. Richmond L.
Rev. 473,  482 (1981). The Claims Court explained the
decisions that relied on a capitalization basis for denying
current deductibility of start up costs as follows:
Although the rationale of these decisions is not fully
articulated, they appear to accept or assume the under-
lying theory that where a business requires substantial
start-up expenditures before it can begin operations,
which are not directly for the purchase of tangible as-
sets and which will not ordinarily be recovered out of
revenues for the same year, the capital investment is in
the business as a whole rather than merely in the tan-
gibles, and it includes the start-up costs.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct.
220, 228 (1985). This implicitly future benefit rationale logi-
cally would deny, however, a current deduction for identical
expenditures incurred once the business commenced. See
Lee, Start-Up Costs, note 27 supra at 31 nn 131, 132.
55The origin of the claim doctrine provides that the origin
and character of a claim determine the deductibility of an
expense. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970); United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). The characterization of
costs depends on the nature of the activities giving rise to
the claim and does not depend on consequence or result.
Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 47-48. See also Keller Street Dev. Co. v.
Commissioner, 688 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1982); TAM 9731001, para.
14, Doc 97-22351 (7 pages), 97 TNT 149-31 (origin of severance
pay agreement between target and key target employees
negotiated in takeover was employment relationship and not
take over); TAM 9527005, 95 TNT 133-7; Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-
2 C.B. 19, Doc 94-10592, 94 TNT 234-10, apparently based on
TAM 9326001, 93 TNT 141-18; GCM 38,126 (Oct. 3, 1979),
considering Rev. Rul. 80-119, 1980 1 C.B. 40. Wells Fargo & Co.
v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874, Doc 2000-22578 (30 original
pages), 2000 TNT 169-18 (8th Cir. 2000), inappropriately
limited the acquisition cost doctrine by allowing current
deduction of the entire salaries of corporate officers who
worked on various aspects of the corporation’s acquisition
on the grounds that to the extent that their services were
incident to the acquisition, they were only incidentally con-
nected with a future benefit. But see Perlmutter, note 53 supra
at 402, 403-05 (“dealt with the deductibility or capitalization
of overhead expenses incurred by a corporation in construct-
ing both a rental property and residential properties for sale.
The Commissioner allocated the overhead expenses (officers’
[regular] salaries, other overhead salaries, depreciation, in-
(Footnote 55 continued in next column.)
surance, legal and audit, office expense, truck expense and
utilities) between the rental property and the sale properties
in proportion to the direct costs of each. Reasoning that
salaries paid officers for services in managing the construc-
tion of new buildings, sales taxes on construction materials,
accounting service fees for construction activities and in-
surance during construction are capital expenditures in con-
nection with the acquisition of a capital asset, the court held
that how much of each of the listed items was attributable to
constructing the rental property was a question of fact, and
therefore upheld the Commissioner ’s allocation in the ab-
sence of a better allocation by the corporation. GCM 38,788
(Aug. 26, 1981), approvingly cited by Idaho Power, note 40
supra at 13, for the proposition that “when wages are paid in
connection with the construction or acquisition of a capital
asset, they must be capitalized and are then entitled to be
amortized over the life of the capital asset so acquired.”
Accord Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374, 390, Doc 2001-
15494 (102 original pages), 2001 TNT 106-4 (2001) (reviewed);
David Lupi-Sher, “Tax Bar Applauds Eighth Circuit’s
Decision in Wells Fargo,” Tax Notes, Sept. 11, 2000, p. 1303.
Lychuk, 116 T.C. at 404-05, appropriately limited Wells Fargo
to where the officers’ performance of services on a capital
transactions were a “relatively small portion” of their time,
i.e., de minimis. Ironically, the employees’ services in Lychuk
were recurring and incident to acquisition of short-lived cap-
ital assets, id. at 420, and hence should have been currently
deducted in any event along with the overhead costs under
rough justice exceptions to future benefit capitalization. See
notes 101-02 infra and accompanying text for discussion of
those exceptions.
56For descriptions of the farm preparatory cost doctrine
under which developmental costs may be expensed or capi-
talized at the farmer ’s option, see Maple v. Commissioner, 440
F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1971); Department of the Treasury,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Reform Studies and Proposals 153
(Comm. Print 1969) (issued jointly by the House Comm. on
Ways and Means and Senate Comm. on Finance). See generally
sources cited in John W. Lee, “A Blend of Old Wines in a New
Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond,” 29 Tax L. Rev. 347, 465 n.
498 and 467 (1974).
57Estate of Wilbur v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 322, 327 n.6
(1964), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 7.
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however, is of substantially shorter duration than that
asset as a whole, it should be treated as a separate asset
and currently deducted or amortized over the period
of recurrence depending on the length of that recur-
rence cycle and perhaps the materiality of that so sep-
arated cost.58
IV. Critique of Broad Application
Given that the function of capitalization is to
produce minimum distortion of the taxpayer ’s in-
come,59 on the surface a rule that requires capitalization
of otherwise currently deductible items appears
counterintuitive.60 As Glenn Carrington, a leading ex-
pert on capitalization, pointed out while still in Chief
Counsel’s office: “[t]he plan of rehabilitation doctrine
is secondary to failure under one of the four prongs of
the [traditional repair versus replacement] test.
‘Rehabilitation alone in my view does not make you
capitalize the costs; you must fail under one of these
four prongs’ . .  . .  The key is the general test, and
whether individual repair expenditures would come
together to represent a capital investment is a ‘facts
and circumstances’ situation. . . .”61
Before the shift in the burden of proof to the gov-
ernment where the taxpayer maintains adequate
records,62 some argued that the rehabilitation doctrine
unfairly increased the taxpayer ’s burden,63 since she
must first negate the general plan of rehabilitation, and
then go on to prove the item constitutes a repair under
the traditional three- or four-factor analysis.64 This was
thought to decrease the Service’s incentive to settle
cases with taxpayers, increasing litigation.65
A. Limitation to Repairs to Same Asset
More significantly, the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine too often serves as a “license to lump unre-
lated items into one predominately capital item.”66 It
thus obscures clear analysis, leading to income-distort-
ing overcapitalization.67 Instances of this tendency are
the Tax Court opinion in Moss v. Commissioner,68
reversed by the Ninth Circuit, and the examining
agent’s arguments reversed in TAM 199952075.69 The
Tax Court in Moss applied the doctrine to painting and
wallpapering of guest rooms in a motel that were inci-
dent to replacement of furnishings and fixtures and
upgrading and remodeling of common areas and res-
taurants which the taxpayer had capitalized. The ex-
amining agent in the TAM similarly applied the general
plan of rehabilitation doctrine to toxic waste remedia-
tion that was incident to the clearly capital construction
of new facilities at a contaminated site.
Given that the function of
capitalization is to produce minimum
distortion of the taxpayer’s income, a
rule that requires capitalization of
otherwise currently deductible items
appears counterintuitive.
The taxpayer in Moss cogently argued on appeal that
the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine’s conceptual
basis is the analogy “to the treatment of repair-like
expenditures incurred in the construction of a new
asset. . . . When both substantial capital improvements
and repairs are made to a particular asset at the same
time, the distinction between the capital improvements
and repairs disappears because all the expenditures
58Cf. Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 27 at 27-8. See notes
196-99 infra and accompanying text for discussion of these
factors.
59B. Bittker and L. Lokken, Federal Income Taxation of In-
come, Estates & Gifts para. 20.4.1 (3rd ed. 1998) (basic objective
of sections 162, 263 and 446(b) in this context is “whether
income will be better reflected by deducting or by capital-
izing the amount in question”); accord Respondent’s Brief at
29, INDOPCO (No. 90-1278); Lee, et al., Rough Justice I, supra
note 5 at 639 n. 20, 692”); Lee, et al., Rough Justice II, supra
note 5 at 1547-48 and n.268.
60Burgess J.W. Raby and William L. Raby, “IRS Splits on
‘General Plan of Renovation’ Argument,” Tax Notes, Aug. 4,
1997, p. 669 at 671 (“It is not so much that we think the
appeals court is wrong in Norwest as a matter of law as that
we think the result fails to properly match revenue with
expense and illustrates what we consider a flaw in the tax
law’s approach to older properties.”) (Raby and Raby, Gen-
eral Plan of Renovation); Sommella, supra note 32 at 390-94;
Hopun, supra note 9 at 704-05, 708; Black, Continuing Saga,
note 25 supra at 1239-40 (yet due to future benefits expendi-
ture must be capitalized under INDOPCO). Cf. Denyse Finn
Clancy, “Comment: The Deductibility of the Costs of Aircraft
Maintenance,” 64 Air L. & Comm. 539, 572 (1999).
61“Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs; Car-
rington Uncertain of Outcome,” 93 TNT 102-10 (May 12,
1993). The four factors or “prongs” are whether the expendi-
ture (1) is more than merely incidental, (2) substantially in-
creases the value, (3) appreciably extends the life, or (4)
changes the use of the associated asset. Carrington used “in-
cidental” as a proxy for substantiality of the cost based on
Wolfsen Land & Cattle v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1, 8 (1979). The
Service, however, holds that cost is not determinative as to
deductible repair vs. capitalizable replacement. Rev. Rul.
2001-4, note 1 supra at 298. The rules would have developed
much more logically and consistently as well as more in
accord with the policy of minimum distortion of income (for
the appropriate standard, see note 99 infra and accompanying
text) had the amount of the cost and whether steady-state
recurring been determinative. Lee, Capitalization Rules, note
36 supra at 678.
62IRC section 7491, enacted as part of the Internal Revenue
Service Restructguring and Reform Act of 1998.
63See Bayles and Rich, note 23 supra at 285.
64See id.
65See id.
66See Bayles and Rich, note 23 supra at 280, n.55.
67See id. “[T]he fact finder ’s function could result in the
sacrifice of many legitimate deductions merely to promote
mechanical facility of decision.” Id. at 287.
68T.C. Memo. 1986-128, rev’d 831 F.2d 833, 839 (9th Cir.
1987).
69TAM 199952075, Doc 2000-475 (12 original pages), 2000
TNT 1-6.
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combine to change the asset’s use, increase its value,
or prolong its life.”70 The Ninth Circuit agreed that this
theory was consistent with the case law, but declined
to adopt the taxpayer ’s bright-line test of whether there
were structural improvements, finding instead the gen-
eral plan of rehabilitation doctrine inapplicable be-
cause the property (a motel) was tenantable, albeit
“tired,” and the doctrine “to date has involved substan-
tial capital improvements and repairs to the same
specific asset, usually a structure in a state of dis-
repair.”71 The Moss limitation of the general plan of
rehabilitation doctrine to repairs made to the same
specific asset that is otherwise being improved is likely
to be its most enduring contribution as evidenced by
TAM 19995207572 and Revenue Ruling 2001-473 dis-
cussed below.
In TAM 199952075 the taxpayer had purchased a
manufactured gas plant that had been in operation for
a n umber of  years  during which toxic waste
byproducts were often disposed of on the plant site in
unlined pits. After continuing to operate the plant for
two years the taxpayer switched over to supplying
natural gas and several years later decommissioned the
existing buildings (which it had been using for storage
and other functions) due to age and condition. Some-
time thereafter EPA examined the site finding no im-
mediate threat to the environment, but put it on the
CERCLA Superfund l i s t  due to  c i rcumstantial
evidence, for example, past industry practices of
dumping toxic waste in unlined pits. Five years after
abandoning the manufacture of natural gas, the tax-
payer in commencing plans to build a new operations
facility on the site undertook an environmental study
that disclosed widespread prior contamination. While
building its new facility, the taxpayer performed exten-
sive environmental cleanup operations on the site, the
costs of which it deducted.
The examining agent recommended capitalization
of such cleanup costs on the grounds that (1) they were
incurred to adapt the site to a new or different use, or
alternatively (2) they constituted part of the costs of
constructing the taxpayer ’s new operations facility,
and in any event (3) they had to be capitalized under
the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine.74 The Na-
tional Office ruled that the clean-up costs attributable
to contamination occurring during the taxpayer ’s use
of the site did not adapt the site to a new or different
use but merely restored it to the condition that existed
when the taxpayer acquired the property75 and for the
same reason did not constitute land preparation costs
(which improve and add value to land).76 The TAM also
declined to apply the general plan of rehabilitation to
the clean-up costs because like Moss, and unlike Nor-
west Corp., they related to a different asset (the land)
than that being improved (the new facility).77 Similarly,
Revenue Ruling 2001-4, in restating the general plan of
rehabilitation doctrine noted that it was inapplicable
“where the plan did not include substantial capital
improvements and repairs to the same asset.”78
In addition to Moss, TAM 199952075 cited Revenue
Ruling 70-392,79 which held that the general plan of
rehabilitation doctrine did not apply to a utility’s labor
and transportation costs for relocating existing capital
assets even though these costs were incurred in con-
junction with the installation of new assets intended to
increase the utility’s distribution voltage. That ruling
concluded that the moving of the assets did not add to
the value or prolong the life of the relocated assets and
appears to have reversed TAM 6905269380A.80 This
reasoning suggests that True v. United States81 probably
incorrectly applied the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine to the costs of moving gas processing machin-
ery (which allowed it to be used longer since the old
field was pumped out). An even simpler current deduc-
tion for removal costs is warranted when the old cap-
ital asset is removed and discarded and a new capital
70Moss v. Commissioner, note 18 supra at 839. Limitation of
the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine to structures in total
disrepair has been accepted by some Tax Court authorities.
See Schroeder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-336, Doc 96-
21076 (20 pages), 96 TNT 145-8. Such a tack is consistent with
the rule of parity basis for the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine discussed above in Part II. The express holding to the
contrary by Norwest Corp., note 22 supra at 280, however, might
result in the doctrine developing otherwise, at least in the Tax
Court. See Vanalco, Inc., note 1 supra (the Ninth Circuit in
affirming the Tax Court on this issue did not discuss the
general plan of rehabilitation yet it did as to another issue).
But see Clancy, note 60 supra at 571 (dicta in Norwest).
71Moss, note 18 supra at 839-40. In Ingram Indus., note 49
supra, the taxpayer ’s towboats were “in operating condition
and are operating when they are brought in to have the
maintenance performed, and all of the significant com-
ponents and systems that comprise the tow boats (including
their engines) are in good working order immediately prior
to the performance of the maintenance . . . and still operable.”
Accordingly, the Tax Court allowed a current deduction for
the costs of cleaning and inspecting the engines every three
to four years “to determine which of their parts are within
acceptable operating tolerances and can be reused and which
(if any) of these parts need to be reconditioned back to ac-
ceptable operating tolerances or replaced with appropriate
replacements.” While the result in Ingram may well have been
correct, the “still operating” reasoning is inconsistent with a
minimum distortion of income analysis. See notes 181-85 infra
and accompanying text.
72Note 69 supra.
73Note 1 supra.
74TAM 199952025, note 69 supra at para. 21. This ap-
proach is reminiscent of TAM 9315004 (capitalization of
PCP toxic waste remediation costs based on four factors)
overruled by Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, Doc 94-5264,
94 TNT 107-12.
75TAM 199952025, note 69 supra at para. 26.
76Id. para. 27.
77Id. para. 29.
78Rev. Rul. 2001-4, note 1 supra at 298.
791970-2 C.B. 33.
80(May 26, 1969).
81894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990).
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asset is installed in its place, for example, removal of
telephone poles.82
B. Restoration Principle and Toxic Waste Remediation
TAM 199952075 ruled that the clean-up costs al-
locable to contamination that occurred during the tax-
payer ’s ownership and operation of the site were cur-
rently deductible under Revenue Ruling 94-3883
because under Plainfield Union84 they merely restored
the site to the condition that existed when the taxpayer
acquired the property.85 In sharp contrast, however, the
TAM required capitalization of the remediation of con-
tamination present when the taxpayer acquired the site
because “the cleanup of pre-existing contamination
does more than restore the Site to the condition that
existed at the time Taxpayer purchased it. Rather, these
costs constitute an improvement or betterment to the
Site compared to its condition when acquired.”86 This
approach is too facile, as shown in section IV below.
Revenue Ruling 94-38 had “scatter cast” a handful
of rationales to bolster the Service’s allowance of a
current deduction for soil remediation costs.87 It
reasoned in part that the appropriate test for determin-
ing whether expenditures increase the value of the
damaged property and thus must be capitalized is com-
parison under Plainfield Union of “the status of the asset
after the expenditure with the status of that asset before
the condition arose that necessitated the expenditure
(that is, before the land was contaminated by X’s hazar-
dous waste).”88 Most believe that the Plainfield Union
restoration principle is the real basis for the ruling; the
value of the contaminated land after remediation is not
increased as compared with its value before contamina-
tion.89 This article asserts that the restoration principle
actually is the less sound basis.
The classic Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner90 defined a “repair” as “to restore to sound state
or to mend.” The Tax Court then began to analyze
whether the expenditure increased the useful life of the
property or made it more valuable than it had been
before the event necessitating the expenditure,91 cul-
minating in the restoration principle of the landmark
Tax Court decision in Plainfield Union Water Co. v. Com-
missioner.92 There the taxpayer was a public water com-
pany seeking to deduct the costs of replacing the lining
in a water main after a switch from neutral well water
to acidic river water caused tuberculation of the pipes,
reducing their carrying capacity. The government as-
serted that the value of the piping to the taxpayer was
materially increased by the expenditure. The Tax Court
replied that “any properly performed repair adds value
as compared with the situation existing immediately
prior to that repair. The proper test is whether the
expenditure materially enhances the value, use, life
expectancy, strength, or capacity as compared with the
status of the asset prior to the condition necessitating
the expenditure.”93
82Rev. Rul. 2000-7, 2000-1 C.B. 712, Doc 2000-3874 (5 original
pages), 2000 TNT 27-22 (costs incurred in retirement and
removal of a depreciable asset occurring in connection with
the installation or production of a replacement asset are not
required to be capitalized under section 263(a) or 263A as part
of the cost of the replacement asset). Sheppard, INDOPCO
Grocery List, note 1 supra at 320 (“The strained rationale of
this ruling is that the removal of the old pole did not relate to
assets having a useful life in the company’s business that
extended substantially beyond the tax year in which they were
incurred, and was performed to retire the old poles, not to
install the new poles. That is, the IRS ignored the pole replace-
ment context of the removal.”). Under the rule of reverse tax
parity the costs of removing the old pole should be currently
deductible on the theory that an outsider could not charge for
the removal of the old pole in that the costs would not be
present in installation of a new pole where no old pole had to
be replaced. See notes 150-51 infra and accompanying text.
83Note 74 supra; see generally articles cited in notes 24 and
25 supra.
84Plainfield Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, note 3 supra.
85TAM 199952075, note 69 supra at paras. 22, 26.
86Id. at para. 32; accord. LTR 200108029, Doc 2001-5469 (10
original pages), 2001 TNT 38-23.
87The ruling contained both a Plainfield Union restoration
principle and no amortization mandates no capitalization
rationales. The widespread criticism on environmental policy
grounds of the toxic waste remediation TAM 9315004, see,
e.g., Juliann Avakian-Martin, “Does the IRS Need to Clean
Up Its Ruling on Cleanup Costs?” Tax Notes, May 10, 1993,
p. 728, probably underlay the Service’s decision to grant a
current deduction. I remain convinced that the TAM’s amor-
tization over some period was preferable to the revenue
ruling’s current deduction. While I have reason to believe
that one of my capitalization articles played a role in that
TAM, see Hearings on Miscellaneous Revenue Issues before
the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue
Measures (Part 2), 103d Cong., 1st Sess 1702 (1993) (Prepared
statement of John W. Lee); I have long advocated the golden
mean that TAM adopted and believe myself not biased
despite my “vested interest,” as Mike Thompson, then Tax
Legislative Counsel for the Treasury Department, put it in a
conversation with me about the TAM and its reversal by Rev.
Rul. 94-38.
88Rev. Rul. 94-38, note 74 supra at 36; see Sheldon D. Pollack,
“Tax Treatment of Environmental Transactions,” 52 Tax Law.
81, 98-9 (1998).
89In addition to TAM 199952075, TAM 9541005, 95 TNT
201-14, withdrawn for other reasons TAM 9627002, Doc 96-19322
(8 pages), 96 TNT 132-16, read Rev. Rul. 94-38 as based on the
restoration principle of Plainfield-Union.
904 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1926); see also Regenstein v. Edwards, 121
F. Supp. 952, 954 (M.D. Ga. 1954) (the cost of installing tem-
porary steps, steel columns, and steel crossbeams were de-
ductible repair expenses necessary to return the property to
its original condition).
91Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635,
639, 641 (1950) (oilproofing meat packing basement after
seepage from nearby oil wells so federal meat inspectors
would not shut down packing plant).
92Note 3 supra.
93Id. at 338. Note that some see this doctrine as contrasting
starkly with the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine. See
Hopun, note 9 supra at 688-89.
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The Service initially resisted the Plainfield Union res-
toration principle94 but then reluctantly accepted it,95
although first attempting to limit the rule to relatively
sudden, unexpected, or unusual external factors96 and
then conversely to where the property has progressive-
ly deteriorated.97 Revenue Rulings 94-38 and 2001-4 are
the Service’s latest concessions.
C. Minimum Distortion of Income
The emerging, better principled view is that while
future benefits are a strong indicator of a capital ex-
penditure as INDOPCO pointed out,98 this indicator
can be rebutted where the burdens to the taxpayer (and
possibly to the government in contesting the tax-
payer ’s deduction of the expenditures in question) of
such capitalization with slow or no depreciation out-
weigh the revenue benefits to the government of more
exact matching from capitalization.99 Notwithstanding
the restoration principle, most repairs do yield future
benefits, else why would the taxpayer make them?
Many of the traditional repair rules can be jus-
tified under one or another of the “rough justice”
balancing exceptions to  future benefi t capital-
ization, for example, (a) not more than 12-month
benefit overlapping two tax years100 (b) small or
“incidental” in amount,101 (c) short-term or vari-
94The government explained that Plainfield Union was not
appealed due to a “factual weakness” in its case. Action on
Decision (Feb. 20, 1966) Elizabethtown Water Co. (successor to
Plainfield Union Water Co.) v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1966-
235.
95AOD CC-1978-35 (Dec. 13, 1977), Niagra Mohawk Power
Corp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 1379 (Ct. Cl. 1977); accord Rev.
Rul. 94-38 note 74 supra.
96Plainfield-Union, note 3 supra at 340-41 (this notion ap-
pears influenced by casualty loss concepts, see, e.g., Rev. Rul.
90-61, 1990-2 C.B. 39; Rev. Rul. 60-329, 1960-2 C.B. 67; GCM
39,427 (Oct. 25, 1985)). Rev. Rul. 94-38, note 74 supra at 36,
cryptically noted that Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-1 C.B. 8 (capital-
ization of cyclical railroad car rehabilitation required because
costs increased value and extended life), considered in GCM
39,743 (July 18, 1988), was modified to the extent that it
implied that the value test established in Plainfield Union
“cannot be an appropriate test in any case other than those
in which there is a sudden and unanticipated damage to an
asset.”
97TAM 9240004 (June 29, 1992) (distinguishing asbestos
removal).
98INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87-8 (1992).
99Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618
(Ct. Cl. 1978) (“The useful life of the survey is very uncertain;
as the trial judge found, the estimates in a reserve study are
subject to change at any time and have to be updated every
few years to take account of subsequent developments. In
those circumstances, it is not compulsory to amortize such a
recurring item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it ap-
propriate to require capitalization without amortization;
such a requirement would clearly distort Southland’s in-
come.”). Cf. U.S. Freightways Corp v. Commissioner, note 5
supra at 1146 (gain in precision for the taxing authorities from
a more perfect matching of expense and income is out-
weighed by the administrative burden the taxpayer would
bear in such matching); “[T]he forthcoming notice of
proposed rulemaking will recognize that many expenditures
that create or enhance intangible assets or benefits do not
create the type of future benefits for which capitalization
under section 263(a) is appropriate, particularly when the
administrative and record keeping costs associated with capital-
ization are weighed against the potential distortion of income.
Advance Notice, note 5 supra at 3,462 (emphasis supplied);
accord Lee, et al., Rough Justice I, note 5 supra at 665; Lee, et
al., Rough Justice II, note 5 supra at 1520.
100U.S. Freightways, note 5 supra at 1146; Advance Notice,
note 5 supra at 3462 (Treasury and the IRS expect to propose
a 12-month rule under which capitalization would not be
required as to expenditures to create or acquire and intangible
benefit unless its benefits “extend beyond the earlier of (i) 12
months after the date on which the taxpayer realizes the rights
or benefits attributable to the expenditure, or (ii) the end of
the taxable year following the taxable year in which the ex-
penditure is incurred.”); Lee, et al., Rough Justice II, note 5
supra at 1522. Earlier authorities applied this rule to tangible
property. Rev. Rul. 59-249, 1959-2 C.B. 55. Chief Counsel has
acknowledged that this one-year life overlapping two tax
years rule may result in some distortion of income, but some
departure from a “strict reading of section 263” is called for
here, i.e., minimum distortion of income as this article advo-
cates. The one-year rule “is a ‘rule of reason’ that is clearly
reasonable under the circumstances involved.” GCM 34,959
(July 25, 1972). The Seventh Circuit in U.S. Freightways agrees.
See also NCNB Corp. v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 942,953 n.21 (4th
Cir. 1981) (NCNB I), rev’d 684 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc),
overruled INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
101Cincinnati, note 8 supra at 572 (“Where the burden on
both taxpayers and Service to account for each item of
property separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion
of income is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so
impracticable that it demands that nevertheless all items be
accounted for individually, no matter what the trouble or the
onus. . . . The burden on plaintiff, if the minimum rule is not
to be followed for income tax purposes, would be heavy; at
the same time, the clearer reflection of income would be
exceedingly slight if there were any at all.”); Sharon v. Com-
missioner, 66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976), aff ’d 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Advance Notice, note
5 supra at 3462 (proposed regulations expected to provide “de
minimis rules, under which certain types of expenditures less
than a specified dollar amount are not required to be capi-
talized); Lee, Capitalization Rules, supra note 36 at 680; Lee,
et al., Rough Justice II, supra note 5 at 1523-27. Cf. sec. 1.162-
12(a), Income Tax Regs., regarding the treatment of inexpen-
sive tools.”). Ingram Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2000-263, applies this factor to repairs. “If we were to
assume that a new automobile cost $30,000, then a 1.6 percent
maintenance cost would equal $480. Relatively and com-
parably, the $100,000 and $480 appear, at least in size, to
represent an incidental as opposed to a major repair, improvement,
or procedure” (emphasis added).
Professor McMahon has “argued that there is no statutory
foundation for a de minimis rule.” Lupi-Sher, supra note 36 at
807. For the contrary argument that Treasury has authority
under the clear reflection of income mandate of section 446
to permit a de minimis rule determined with a balancing of
burdens and benefits standard see Lee, et al., “Rough Justice
I,” note 5 supra at 689 n.235 and 708; Lee, et al., “Rough Justice
II,” note 5 supra at 1523-27; both citing GCM 34,959 (July 25,
1972) (“we believe section 461 gives the Commissioner au-
thority to direct the timing of deductions in a manner that
(Footnote 101 continued on next page.)
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able  benefit,102 or  (d) regularly recurring.103 Even
where these exceptions are not available, several au-
thorities hold that if depreciation is not available, cap-
italization is not appropriate since capitalization
without depreciation would distort the taxpayer ’s in-
come.104 Even where depreciation is available, if the
recovery period is much longer than the future bene-
fit of the expenditure, distortion of income would
also result. If so, a current deduction or amortization
over an arbitrary period produces less distortion of
income, that is, “minimum distortion of income,” than
the ideal slow or no depreciation would cause.105 This
“second best” approach is demanded by clear reflec-
tion of income as a rule of equity or “rough justice.”106
will clearly reflect income. Although the exercise of this au-
thority has generally been aimed at proscribing methods that
fail to clearly reflect income, there is little doubt that it is
broad enough to permit the recognition of additional
methods that allow a clear reflection of income, even though
such methods may appear to be a variance with a narrow
interpretation of specific language of the Code.”).
102Southland Royalty, note 99 supra at 616-18; Iowa-Des
Moines Nat’l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir.
1979) (“Any credit information is short-lived and subject to
sudden change. Thus, credit information must be current to
be valuable and the taxpayers soon had a history of who did
or did not pay the credit card charges. This new information
was far more useful to taxpayers than the information pur-
chased with the payments in dispute here. The fact that there
may be some ensuing benefit and future effect from the ex-
penditure beyond the taxable year when paid is not con-
trolling. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn., 403 U.S.
345 (1971). Where the prospective benefit is very slight, cap-
italization is not easily supported.”). See generally Lee, Capi-
talization Rules, note 36 supra at 680; Lee, et al., Rough Justice
II, note 5 supra at 1527-28. The repair/improvement formula-
tion is whether the expenditure makes the asset longer-lived.
Plainfield Union, note 3 supra.
103U.S. Freightways, note 5 supra at 1145 (“Because they
recur every year, there is less distorting effect on income from
future tax year benefits over time. In every year, that is, while
Freightways will be able to reap the tax advantage of deduc-
tion for some part of the following twelve months, it will
have ‘lost’ the deductions for the months covered by the prior
year ’s licenses, for which it has already received the benefit.
In a hypothetical last year of Freightways’ corporate life, it
would finally be entitled to only a prorated deduction for
licenses (if any) that are acquired during that year, partially
evening out the score with the first year of deductions.”);
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215
(7th Cir. 1982) (“[A]llocating these expenditures among the
different books is not always necessary to produce the tem-
poral matching of income and expenditures that the Code
desiderates, because the taxable income of the author or pub-
lisher who is in a steady state (that is, whose output is neither
increasing nor decreasing) will be at least approximately the
same whether his costs are expensed or capitalized. Not the
same on any given book — on each book expenses and
receipts will be systematically mismatched — but the same
on average. Under these conditions the benefits of capital-
ization are unlikely to exceed the accounting and other ad-
ministrative costs entailed in capitalization.”) (dictum); Ad-
vance Notice, note 5 supra at 3462 (proposed regulations
expected to provide “a ‘regular and recurring rule,’ under
which transaction costs incurred in transactions that occur
on a regular and recurring basis in the routine operation of
a taxpayer ’s trade or business are not required to be capital-
ized”); Lee, Capitalization Rules, note 36 supra at 680; Lee, et
al., Rough Justice II, note 5 supra at 1529-31, 1539-43; Lupi-
Sher, Decision in Wells Fargo, note 55 supra at 1303 (“In light
of the decisions in Wells Fargo and PNC, [Pamela] Olson
believes that the reach of INDOPCO has been limited when
the issue concerns expenses that were regular and recurring
and incurred by a company in the ordinary course of con-
ducting its business. ‘The goal in this area should be a clearer
reflection of income and administrative ease,’ she said.”). For
(Footnote 103 continued in next column.)
application of this factor in the repair versus improvement
context, see P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 269, 272
(4th Cir. 1946) (“The work done was more in the nature of a
permanent betterment or restoration than a recurrent repair or
upkeep. The benefits to petitioner were to last over a period
of several years, perhaps for the remaining life of the barge.
It was more like putting on a new roof . . . .”) (emphasis sup-
plied).
104Southland Royalty, note 99 supra at 618; Colorado Springs
Nat’l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 1974)
(“The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a
property interest. They produced nothing corporeal or sal-
able. They are recurring. At the most they introduced a more
efficient method of conducting an old business. The govern-
ment suggests no way in which they could be amortized. The
government’s theoretical approach ignores the practicalities
of the situation, and permits a distortion of taxpayer’s finan-
cial situation. If an expenditure, concededly of temporal
value, may be neither expensed nor amortized, the adoption
of technological advances is discouraged.”); Lee, et al., Rough
Justice II, note 5 supra at 1549. In the repair versus improve-
ment context Rev. Rul. 94-38 reasoned alternatively that
where amortization is not available, capitalization is not ap-
propriate. See notes 108-112 infra and accompanying text.
105Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, note 61 supra
at 27 (“To permit a current deduction of such a large expen-
diture with a beneficial effect lasting on the average of 10
years would surely distort that year ’s income. Yet to deny
even an amortization deduction for an expenditure with a
specific demonstrable beneficial life on the grounds that its
deductibility is contaminated by its relationship to an asset
of indefinite life, i.e., the land, would similarly require an
uneven reporting of income. Since a basic premise of the
income tax laws is to relate expenses to the income which
they helped earn, a reasonable solution to our conundrum is
to hold that the expenses in issue should be written off over
their useful life. In short we would subscribe independent
status to those expenditures on the basis that they create a
free-standing intangible asset with an amortizable 10-year
life.”); Lee, Capitalization Rules, note 36 supra at 680. This
approach was in effect followed in the repair versus improve-
ment context in TAM 9315004, see note 109 infra.
106The core idea of rough justice is the use of simple ad-
ministrative rules that work well enough on average in lieu
of either detailed rules pursuing theoretical purity or case
law uncertainty. Its principal virtue is the reduction of ad-
ministrative costs to the taxpayer, to the Service, or to both
while yielding minimum distortion of income. Aside from
reducing compliance and enforcement costs, rough justice
connotes an approximation of the just result. In some cases,
rough justice is a “second best” surrogate or proxy tax; how-
ever, it generally seeks to effect better rather than unjust
(Footnote 106 continued on next page.)
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D. Nondepreciable Remediation Costs
Applying a restoration principle analysis logically
to the facts in Revenue Ruling 94-38,107 there was no
increase in the value of the contaminated property
compared before the contamination of the ground
water with the value after the construction of the
ground water pumping station either, yet the ruling
required capitalization of the costs of such pumping
station108 because they created a capital asset that could
be depreciated. Accordingly, I believe that Revenue
Ruling 94-38’s more significant statement is that where
amortization is not available (since the costs of soil
remediation would be added to the nondepreciable
land),109 capitalization is not appropriate either,110 pre-
sumably because capitalization without depreciation
would distort the taxpayer ’s income more than a cur-
rent deduction would.111 For when a taxpayer ’s only
options are a current deduction or capitalization
without amortization for expenditures with temporally
limited benefits, a current deduction generally creates
less income distortion than capitalization without
depreciation.112 The goal is a tax accounting rule result-
ing in minimum distortion of income.113
To determine whether the taxpayer ’s method of tax
accounting of tax accounting clearly reflects her in-
come, the starting point is that capitalization, deprecia-
tion, and clear reflection of income are “inextricably
intertwined.”114 Income distortion, therefore, occurs
when capitalized costs cannot be amortized to roughly
match the expense with the associated income. Income
distortion also occurs when the costs are deducted im-
mediately but provide benefits substantially beyond
the current period. Given the choice between these two
income distorting methods, a current deduction is bet-
ter because it produces less income distortion by at least
matching some of the expense with the revenue
produced in the current period — permanent capital-
ization never matches any part of the expense with
revenue.115
Under this absence of depreciation rationale there is
a difference between the pumping station costs and the
soil remediation or reclamation costs in Revenue
Ruling 94-38. The former, but not the latter, relate to a
depreciable asset. Similarly under an absence of
results — fair on average for a class of taxpayers but not
necessarily just as to each affected taxpayer. Rough justice
also may be viewed as equity versus rule (equity versus law
in the Anglo-American lexicon) or as substance versus form
— an age-old battle between the spirit and the letter of the
law. Under this view, rough justice envisions equity overcom-
ing the rule of law. Lee, et al., Rough Justice I, note 5 supra
at 712-13, 718-21, Lee, Start-Up Costs, note 27 supra at 5-6 and
n.8. For a detailed discussion of “rough justice” both in the
context of ease of administration and of the jurisprudential
literature, from which the preceding is derived, see Lee, et
al., Rough Justice I, note 5 supra at 712-39.
107Note 74 supra.
108The Service’s historical tendency has been to find some
depreciable asset (e.g., a building, permit, license, or personal
property such as natural gas piping) with which to associate
the costs at issue, capitalize them to such asset and then
permit depreciation. Lee, et al., Rough Justice II, note 5 supra
at 1550-52. Treating the costs as a freestanding amortizable
deferred charge would be preferable.
109In the prior TAM, TAM 9315004, in effect reversed by
Rev. Rul. 94-38, the costs were capitalized to the chief operat-
ing asset of the taxpayer. Juliann Avakian-Martin, “INDOP-
CO Guidance Likely to Cover Advertising, Repairs, Train-
ing,” Tax Notes, Aug. 3, 1992, p. 545 (Carrington “let it slip
that in that TAM, the cleanup costs were amortized to the
piping system. That fact was blacked out when the TAM was
released.”); Glenn Carrington, “Capitalization After INDOP-
CO,” 2 N.Y.U. Inst. On Fed. Tax. chapter. 25, at 25-29 (1995)
(taxpayer in TAM 9315004 operated a natural gas pipeline).
110Rev. Rul. 94-38, note 74 supra (reversing a TAM requiring
the capitalization of soil remediation costs in part on the
rationale that “since the land is not subject to an allowance
for depreciation, amortization, or depletion, the amounts ex-
pended to restore the land to its original condition are not
subject to capitalization”).
111Cincinnati, note 8 supra at 572 (“The burden on plaintiff,
if the minimum rule is not to be followed for income tax
purposes, would be heavy; at the same time, the clearer
reflection of income would be exceedingly slight if there were
any at all.”); Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank, note 102 supra at 436
(“Where the prospective benefit is very slight, capitalization
is not easily supported.”); Encylopaedia Britannica, note 103
supra at 213-17 (Posner, J.) (“the benefits of capitalization are
unlikely to exceed the accounting and other administrative
costs entailed in capitalization.”); Southland Royalty, note 99
(Footnote 111 continued in next column.)
supra at 618 (“In those circumstances, it is not compulsory to
amortize such a recurring item over a fixed time interval.
Neither is it appropriate to require capitalization without
amortization; such a requirement would clearly distort
Southland’s income.”); Lee, et al., Rough Justice II, note 5
supra at 1549-53. Similar reasoning led courts to adopt the
since discredited separate salable asset rule that permitted
an immediate deduction when no separate, transferable asset
was created by an expenditure. E.g., Colorado Springs Nat’l
Bank, note 104 supra at 1192. By adopting this rule, courts
could avoid the harsh result of capitalizing nonamortizable
expansion costs by claiming that no identifiable asset was
present. See Lee, Start-Up Costs, note 27 supra at 51-57; Lee,
Capitalization Rules, note 36 supra at 677.
112Lee, Start-Up Costs, supra note 27 at 26; accord Hal I.
Gann, “Capital ization: Get Back to Where You Once
Belonged,” 1 49th [So. Cal.] Tax Inst. Major Tax Planning 2-33,
at para. 205.3 (1997).
113See Liquid Paper Corp. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 284 (1983)
(deduction of royalty payments as paid where purchase price
constituted an open transaction accurately reflect the annual
cost of patent with minimum distortion of income); Newton
Insert Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 570 (1974); Rev. Rul. 67-136,
1967-1 C.B. 58.
114Cincinnati, note 8 supra at 569 (quoting Fort Howard Paper
Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967) (Tannenwald,
J.)).
115See the seminal Alan Gunn, “The Requirement That a
Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset,” 15 B.C.
Indus. & Comm’l. L. Rev. 443, 492 (1974) (“In the absence of a
feasible method of amortizing costs . . . a current deduction
may be preferable to capitalization as a method of clearly
reflecting income.”); accord Lee, Start-Up Costs, note 27 supra
at 73 n.315; Kenneth W. Gideon, “Assessing the Income Tax:
Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness,” Tax Notes, Nov. 23, 1998,
p. 999 at 1003 (perpetual capitalization distorts the taxpayer ’s
income).
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depreciation analysis, remediation of both pre-existing
contamination of unimproved real estate and of similar
contamination attributable to the taxpayer ’s use would
not create a depreciable cost. In many cases, however,
the costs of cleaning up pre-existing contamination
should be capitalized as a deferred purchase price for
reasons other than the inapplicability of any “restora-
tion” principle.
E. Capitalization of Anticipated Remediation 
Are costs of remediating toxic waste contamination
existing in a site when acquired by a taxpayer auto-
matically currently deductible since amortization
would not be available if these costs were capitalized?
TAM 9541005116 reveals a valid rationale under which
some such nondepreciable costs may nevertheless have
to be capitalized. It held that hazardous waste remedia-
tion costs were not deductible under section 162 by a
taxpayer who acquired the land in a contaminated
state.117 One leg of TAM 9541005 presaged TAM
199952025 and United Dairy Farmers, Inc., v. United
States118 by limiting the Plainfield Union or “restoration
principle” of Revenue Ruling 94-28 to where “the tax-
payer acquire[s] the property in a clean condition, con-
taminate[s] the property in the course of its everyday
business operations, and incur[s] costs to restore the
property to its condition at the time the taxpayer ac-
quired the property.” But TAM 9541005 alluded to a
sounder basis for requiring a taxpayer to capitalize
hazardous waste remediation costs when the taxpayer
knowingly purchases property in a contaminated state
by citing Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre v. Commissioner.119
The latter in effect holds that a cost incurred after ac-
quisition, but anticipated at such time, must be capi-
talized as an acquisition cost under the rationale that
until the anticipated cost is incurred the taxpayer’s
investment is not complete.120 Mt. Morris Drive-In used
language reminiscent of the Arrowsmith doctrine121 —
“If petitioner had included in its original construction
plans an expenditure for a proper drainage system no
one could doubt that such an expenditure would have
been capital in nature.”122
Where a taxpayer expects to incur further expense
to remediate a defect known at the time of acquisition,
she rationally discounts her original purchase price for
the anticipated costs.123 Thus, later payment of these
costs constitutes payment of deferred acquisition costs.
Accordingly, if the taxpayer in TAM 199952075 were
aware of the pre-existing contamination and dis-
counted its purchase price for anticipated remediation
costs, such costs would constitute capitalizable acquisi-
tion costs. If, however, the taxpayer was not aware of
the extent of the pre-existing contamination and there-
fore did not so reduce its purchase price, the remedia-
tion costs should not be capitalizable as [delayed] ac-
quisition costs.124 If the unanticipated costs were added
to the basis of the land they would be nondepreciable
and hence their capitalization would distort the tax-
116Note 89 supra, revoked and superseded by TAM 9627002,
note 89 supra.
117See 143 Cong. Rec. S 860 (Senate Jan. 30, 1997 Daily Ed.)
(Remarks of Sen. D’Amato, R-N.Y.) (“Under current law, the
IRS has determined that costs incurred to clean up land and
ground water are deductible as business expenses, as long as
the costs are incurred by the same taxpayer that con-
taminated the land, and that taxpayer plans to use the land
after the cleanup for the same purposes used prior to the
cleanup. That means that new owners who wish to use land
suspected of environmental contamination for a new pur-
pose, would be precluded from deducting the costs of
cleanup in the year incurred. They would only be allowed to
capitalize the costs and depreciate them over time.”).
118107 F. Supp.2d 937, Doc 2000-17988 (20 original pages),
2000 TNT 128-41 (S.D. Ohio 2000), aff ’d 267 F.3d 510, Doc
2001-25388 (29 original pages), 2001 TNT 193-5 (6th Cir. 2001),
discussed at notes 142-44 infra and accompanying text.
119T.C. 272, 274 (1955) (“[I]t was obvious at the time when
the drive-in theatre was constructed, that a drainage system
would be required to properly dispose of the natural
precipitation normally to be expected, and that until this was
accomplished, petitioner ’s capital investment was incom-
plete. In addition, it should be emphasized that here there
was no mere restoration or rearrangement of the original
capital asset, but there was the acquisition and construction
of a capital asset which petitioner had not previously had,
namely, a new drainage system.”), aff ’d per curiam 238 F.2d
85 (6th Cir. 1956); TAM 9541005, note 89 supra (perceptively
reading Mt. Morris Drive-In as an example of origin of claim
doctrine); see generally Lee, Start-Up Costs, note 27 supra at
30 n.121.
120Cf., Bayles and Rich, note 23 supra at 284 (“Acquisition
of a building and its immediate, substantial renovation is
difficult to view as anything other than a single competed
transaction.”); accord Haeder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-
7, Doc 2001-1789 (47 original pages), 2001 TNT 12-19 (“The fact
that petitioners had the rug appraised and repaired in the year
of purchase suggests that those repairs were part of their
capital investment in the rug.”).
121Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8 (1952). See Lee
and Murphy, supra note 54 at 499-509 (origin-of-the-claim
doctrine, classic tax benefit doctrine, and Arrowsmith-Skelly
Oil consider two transactions together to prevent distortion
of income); Timothy A. Rodgers, Note: “The Transaction Ap-
proach to the Origin of the Claim Doctrine: A Proposed Cure
for Chronic Inconsistency,” 55 Brooklyn L. Rev. 905, 938 (1989)
(“Arrowsmith ‘open transaction’ doctrine — an expense as-
sumes the tax character of the original transaction from
which it arises — is directly analogous to the origin of the
claim doctrine.”) (citing Lee and Murphy).
122Mt. Morris Drive-In, note 119 supra at 274 (“In the instant
case it was obvious at the time when the drive-in theatre was
constructed, that a drainage system would be required to
properly dispose of the natural precipitation normally to be
expected, and that until this was accomplished, petitioner ’s
capital investment was incomplete.”). The Court in Ar-
rowsmith stated that “It is not even denied that had this
judgment been paid after liquidation, but during the year
1940, the losses would have been properly treated as capital
ones. For payment during 1940 would simply have reduced
the amount of capital gains taxpayers received during that
year.” Arrowsmith, note 121 supra at 8.
123Blake Rubin, et al., “The Tax Treatment of Environmen-
tal Cleanup Costs,” 54th N.Y.U. Inst. On Fed. Tax., 11-1, 11-15
(1996).
124The contrary holding in United Dairy Farmers is criti-
cized at note 143 infra and accompanying text.
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payer ’s income.125 Thus unanticipated clean-up costs
should be currently deductible.
1. Restoration principle and contamination dis-
covered after purchase. The same differentiation be-
tween  known and unknown pre-ex ist ing
contamination could be reached under one reading of
the restoration principle. In Norwest Corp. v. Commis-
sioner the Tax Court reasoned that absent the general
plan of rehabilitation the costs of asbestos remediation
would be deductible under the Plainfield Union restora-
tion principle. Proponents of a current deduction of the
costs of remediating asbestos for instance maintain that
instead of the remediated property being valued for
purposes of the Plainfield Union test as of just before
the condition occurred126 (original installation of the
asbestos insulation), it should be valued as of just
before the taxpayer came to know that the hazardous
condition would necessitate repair or remediation.127
One commentator suggests that the preferable alter-
native is to use the date after the problem was dis-
covered as the “before” time because it more accurately
reflects the economic reality of the taxpayer ’s decision
to incur the cost: (1) the choice is forward-looking; (2)
the property no longer performs as intended; (3) this
creates more accurate results and simpler adminis-
tration; and (4) the matching of income with the expen-
diture is better.128 He notes that by applying Plainfield
Union using the understanding of asbestos hazards as
the “before” point a current deduction of asbestos en-
capsulation and monitoring costs should still be
allowed.129
The parties in Norwest Corp. not surprisingly dis-
agreed as to the point at time at which “before” was
determined under the Plainfield Union restoration prin-
ciple. The taxpayer argued that “before” meant just
before the point of discovery of the hazard from the
asbestos insulation.130 The Commissioner maintained
that it meant before the installation of the asbestos so
that the Plainfield Union doctrine did not apply. She
reasoned that since the asbestos was present from the
moment when the building was first placed in ser-
vice,131 there was no time at which the building existed
before the condition occurred with which to contrast
the value of the building after the condition ap-
peared.132 The Tax Court in Norwest Corp. implicitly
rejected the Commissioner ’s argument. Noting that the
parties had stipulated that asbestos removal [and rein-
sulation] did not increase the useful tax life of the
building, the court agreed with the taxpayer that such
removal did increase the building’s value “compared
to its value when it was known to contain a hazard.”133
(Asbestos substitutes generally are less efficient in-
sulators.)134 Norwest Corp. thus rebuffed the Commis-
sioner ’s contention “that the expenditures for asbestos
removal materially increased the value of the building
so as to require them to be capitalized.”135 Implicitly
the issue, therefore, was whether “before” in the Plain-
field Union test meant before the discovery of the
hazard, or before the date of the asbestos installment.136
The court must have concluded the former, to say that
asbestos removal itself did not increase the value of the
building sufficiently as to require its cost to be capital-
ized.137 In a 1993 House Ways and Means subcommittee
hearing, some witnesses maintained that since environ-
mental remediation added no value, its costs should
be deductible as a repair.138 This would lead to the
conclusion that asbestos removal does not materially
125In LTR 200108029, note 86 supra, the taxpayer requested
a ruling that its costs for environmental remediation of con-
tamination existing at the time of purchase be capitalized
(apparently because it was to receive insurance proceeds for
such costs). The ruling held that the costs should be capital-
ized because the taxpayer acquired the land in a contaminated
state. “Therefore, the expenditures for the remediation opera-
tions increased the value of the land, by improving the land
from a contaminated stated to a remediated state.” Id. at para.
32. The taxpayer was unaware of the contamination at pur-
chase. Id. at paras. 4, 9, and 10. Hence, taxpayer would not
have discounted its purchase price for the contamination dis-
covered five and six years after its purchase. Since no
depreciation would have been allowed for remediation costs
capitalized to the land and Mt. Morris Drive-In would not
apply, a current deduction should be allowed. See notes 119-22
supra and accompanying text.
126Thomas H. Yancey, “Emerging Doctrines in the Tax
Treatment of Environmental Cleanup Costs,” 70 Taxes 948,
960 (1992). For a sound criticism of many of the articles in
this niche, see Pollack, supra note 88 at 90-92.
127See generally Letter from Bonnie V. Hancock of Carolina
Power & Light Company to Internal Revenue Service dated
May 6, 1996, Doc 96-14603 (7 pages), 96 TNT 98-31; cf. David
G. Coolidge, Note, “A Square Hole for a Square Peg: Section
165 and Environmental Cleanup Costs,” 14 Va. Tax Rev. 779,
794-95 (1995).
128See id. at 798-99.
129See id. at 817 (citing to Professor Calvin Johnson, this
commentator argues that removal costs should be capital-
ized, but that encapsulation and monitoring costs can be
currently deducted).
130Norwest Corp., note 22 supra at 281.
131Treas. reg. section 1.167(a)-11(e)(1)(i) (“Property is first
placed in service when first placed in a condition of readiness
and availability for a specifically assigned function, whether
in a trade or business, in the production of income, in a
tax-exempt activity or in a personal activity.”).
132Norwest, note 22 supra at 283.
133Id. at 284 (emphasis supplied).
134E.g., Coolidge, note 127 supra at 797; TAM 9240004, note
97 supra; Eileen S. Mazo, Note, “Taxing Our Way to a More
Polluted Environment,” 6 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 357, 373 (1995);
Gaba, note 24 supra at 90.
135Norwest Corp., note 22 supra at 283. The Tax Court
acknowledged that the asbestos removal did increase the
value of the building compared to when it was known to
contain a hazard.
136Id. at 281, 284.
137See id. at 284.
138Hearings on Miscellaneous Revenue Issues before the
House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue
Measures (Part 2), 103d Cong., 1st Sess 1608-10 (1993)
(Prepared statement of Roy E. Hock, representing the Coali-
tion to Preserve the current Deductibility of Environmental
Remediation Costs).
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increase the property’s value from its value before dis-
covery of the contamination or its effects.139
Similarly where a taxpayer purchases property not
knowing of contamination and subsequently uncovers
it, remediation restores the property to its value before
discovery. In the real world today buyers do usually
undertake toxic waste surveys before purchasing
property, but there are indications in TAM 199952075
that the taxpayer was not aware of the extent of con-
tamination before disturbing the soil and undertaking
a toxic waste survey for new construction. In LTR
200108029140 the taxpayer was clearly unaware of the
pre-existing contamination. Even if the taxpayer were
aware of the contamination but did not anticipate at
purchase remediating it, for example, anticipating con-
tinued use for the same purpose, a current deduction
should be allowed when the taxpayer changes its plans
tr igger ing a  remediat ion requirement because
depreciation would be unavailable if the cost were cap-
italized and the cost would not constitute a deferred
acquisition cost.141
The district court in United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v.
United States,142 incorrectly, however, denied such a cur-
rent deduction, holding that the restoration rule was
inapplicable where the taxpayer acquired convenience
stores not knowing of the underground contamination
from previously removed gasoline pumps. It held the
restoration principle of Revenue Ruling 94-28 did not
apply because the property (a convenience store with
paved-over, abandoned gasoline storage tanks) was
contaminated when acquired.143 Furthermore, the dis-
trict court reasoned that the taxpayer overpaid for the
properties because the market values were really lower
due to the contamination; hence
had the prices of the properties been adjusted to
reflect the contamination on the properties, its
remediation expenditures would have increased
the values of the properties, and, therefore those
costs would have to have been capitalized. The
Court sees no reason for the taxpayer ’s subjective
belief as to the value of the property to control
the determination of whether its remediation
costs are deductible or whether they must be cap-
italized. Indeed, there are good policy reasons
that it should not. Such a rule would discourage
taxpayers from proceeding with appropriate
diligence in making such an acquisition, sure in
the knowledge that whatever costs they incurred
to salvage their investment would be deductible
immediately. This does not seem to be a wise
course to follow.144
This approach is inconsistent with the Tax Court
opinion in Norwest Corp., where the “before” com-
ponent of the “restoration” test was before the taxpayer
became aware of the effects of the contamination.145
Norwest Corp. won the
Plainfield-Union battle over asbestos
clean-up costs, but lost the
capitalization war.
In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit
agreed that the restoration principle was inapplicable
to defects present when the taxpayer purchased the
property and pointed out that clean-up costs of
$260,000 as to properties purchased for $760,000 were
not “incidental” expenditures.146 It went on to “har-
monize”  Dominion Resources (discussed below),147
Plainfield Union, and Revenue Ruling 94-38.
As noted by the government in its brief on appeal,
when taken together, Dominion Resources, Plain-
field Union, and Revenue Ruling 94-38 can be har-
monized in a coherent framework. That is, three
elements must be satisfied for a valid deduction
under section 162 for environmental cleanup
costs: first, the taxpayer contaminated the proper-
ty in its ordinary course of business; second, the
taxpayer cleaned up the contamination to restore
the property to its pre-contamination state; third,
the cleanup did not allow the taxpayer to put the
property to a new use. In Dominion Resources, the
taxpayer did not satisfy the third element, be-
cause the cleanup allowed the taxpayer to put the
property to new use as a real estate development.
Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 370. In this case, failure
to satisfy the first element is sufficient for reject-
ing UDF’s soil remediation claim.148
F. Rule of Reverse Tax Parity
Norwest Corp. concluded that the asbestos removal
was sufficiently intertwined by logistical and economic
concerns with the clearly capital remodeling of the
taxpayer ’s bank building to come under the general
plan of rehabilitation doctrine. Thus Norwest Corp.
won the Plainfield Union battle over asbestos clean-up
costs, but lost the capitalization war. On the basis of
doctrine and even more policy, I believe that the Tax
Court in Norwest Corp. incorrectly applied the Wehrli149
general plan of rehabilitation tax doctrine to asbestos
removal costs. The asbestos remediation itself added
139See Mazo, note 134 supra at 370.
140Note 86 supra. The apparent source of the contamination
was the unsuccessful attempt by an employee of the prior
owner to distill the toxic substance and then freezing barrels
containing the substance and dumping the ice mass at the
top of the barrels on the ground. The taxpayer was unaware
of any of this at time of purchase.
141The deduction might be more appropriate under section
165 than section 162. See Coolidge, note 127 supra at 802-11.
142Note 118 supra.
143Id. at 942.
144Id.
145See notes 128-39 supra and accompanying text.
146United Dairy Framers, note 118 supra.
147See notes 154-61 infra and accompanying text.
148Id. at 519.
149United States v. Wehrli, note 22 supra at 689, is the most
often cited modern authority adopting the general plan of
rehabilitation doctrine.
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no value, according to the Tax Court, while the overall
remodeling presumably added close to its cost in value
at least to the taxpayer. It is thus debatable whether the
doctrine as traditionally construed should have ap-
plied in Norwest Corp.150
A more fundamental objection to Norwest Corp. is
that the reverse rule of tax parity should permit an
ordinary deduction for asbestos remediation incurred
in connection with remodeling. The rule of parity
should apply in reverse so that a taxpayer self-
construct in g an  i tem w ould not  be tax disad-
vantaged as compared with a taxpayer purchasing
the item.151 Assume that a taxpayer purchases a
remodeled and remediated building for use in her busi-
ness and the seller had removed existing asbestos in-
sulation. In a fair market value purchase of that asbes-
tos remediated property, the seller would bear the cost
of asbestos remediation because a [new] comparable
replacement building would have no asbestos insulation
and hence no cost of remediation. The seller could not
economically include the remediation cost in her sales
price and be competitive with a comparable new build-
ing. (The seller may be allowed an ordinary deduction
for that remediation.)152 Accordingly, under the rule of
parity a taxpayer self-remediating asbestos insulation
should not have to capitalize her cost under the general
plan of rehabilitation doctrine even when undertaken
in conjunction with remodeling as in Norwest Corp.
Otherwise, a taxpayer undertaking the remodeling and
removal of asbestos in a building will be tax disad-
vantaged compared to a taxpayer purchasing a com-
parable remodeled building as to which the seller
removed the asbestos.153
In Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States,154 the
Fourth Circuit declined to place “the focus on how
much value an improvement adds to property.”155
Rather, it analyzed the nature of the improvement. “If
the improvement permits the property to be utilized in
a different way, the improvement is most appropriately
considered a capital expenditure. If the improvement
only restores value to the property that existed prior
to deterioration or to a discrete event that damaged the
property, the improvement may be properly treated as
a deductible repair expense.”156 Significantly, the
Fourth Circuit noted that “the cost of the environmen-
tal cleanup, $2.2 million, may have dwarfed the value
of the property itself prior to the cleanup — DLI paid
$870,167 for it, and the average appraised value was
less than $1.6 million.”157 (After remediation, the ap-
praised value was $9 million.)158 Rather than analyzing
this case as a discounted purchase price, the Fourth
Circuit applied a substantial alteration in character
analysis.
In fact, the cleanup did even more than create the
possibility of a new use for the property; it lifted
the property out of what was essentially a condi-
tion of uselessness. DRI’s contention — that the
property could be sold “as is” both before and
after the improvements — would permit the tax-
payer to deduct the cost of any improvement.
Because the environmental cleanup substantially
altered the character of the 12th Street property,
enabling DRI to “put” the property to a wide
range of new uses, Estate of Walling, 373 F.2d at
192, the cleanup costs permanently improved the
property and so, as the district court found, must
be capitalized.159
Although only obliquely recognized by the cases,160
the alteration of character notion also rests on the rule
of tax parity.161 A taxpayer altering the character of the
property should be treated the same as a taxpayer pur-
chasing property for a new use. Accordingly, under the
rule of reverse tax parity, if such a purchaser would
not economically bear the cost of the seller ’s remedia-
tion and hence would not in effect include the costs in
her basis, then a taxpayer performing the remediation
herself and thereby altering her use of the property
should not be required to capitalize those costs and
should be permitted to currently deduct them. If, how-
ever, the purchaser discounted its price for the
remediation, she would be required to capitalize them
as a deferred purchase price.
G. Norwest Corp. and Economic Inefficiency
The holding in Norwest Corp. as to capitalization of
asbestos remediation under the general plan of
rehabilitation doctrine results in economic inefficiency.
The Tax Court noted that combining the asbestos
remediation with remolding was less expensive than
carrying out each separately.162 After Norwest Corp.
with its implication that asbestos remediation per-
formed not in connection with remodeling would be
currently deductible, tax advisers may be expected to
recommend that asbestos remediation be so performed
before remodeling. As long as the two activities are not
150See text accompanying note 24 supra.
151United Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
278, 290 at 295 (1975) (Wilbur, J., concurring). Cf. Iowa-Des
Moines Nat’l Bank v. Commissioner, note 102 supra at 435-36
(costs of purchased credit  reports could be currently
deducted because “had taxpayers directly acquired credit
information, capitalization of the expense, including em-
ployee wages, would not have been required.”).
152Michelle Kamen Friedman and Avi D. Liveson, “Tax
Treatment of Environmental Clean Up Costs,” 26 J. Real Estate
Tax’n 20, n.8 (1999).
153See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
154219 F.3rd 359, Doc 2000-20314 (21 original pages), 2000
TNT 148-5, aff’g 48 F. Supp. 2d 527, Doc 1999-11413 (71 original
pages), 1999 TNT 59-16 (E.D. Va. 1999).
155Dominion Resources, 219 F.3rd at 371.
156Id.
157Id. at 372.
158Dominion Resources, 48 F. Supp.2d at 554.
159Dominion Resources, 219 F.3rd at 372.
160Stoelzing v. Commissioner, note 48 supra (taxpayer bought
an old building and made a new and different building,
commercially useful, out of it).
161Lee, Capitalization Rules, note 36 supra at 678.
162Norwest Corp., note 22 supra.
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linked under the step transaction doctrine,163 the asbes-
tos remediation would be currently deductible under
the intimations in Norwest Corp. rather than being
depreciable over almost 40 years. The tax savings sure-
ly would much more than offset any increased pre-tax
costs of separately remediating and remodeling. The
tax and not economic consequences thus will drive the
structuring of the asbestos remediation.
Assume, as Norwest Corp. holds, that a taxpayer in
Scenario A remodeling a building and hence hastening
asbestos remediation must capitalize the asbestos
remediation costs and then depreciate them straight-
line over almost 40 years, but can take a current deduc-
tion if the asbestos remediation is taken apart from a
remodeling. (The apparent difference is the, in my
opinion, “erroneous” application of the “general plan
of rehabilitation” doctrine because otherwise, accord-
ing to Norwest Corp., no value or increase in useful life
is added by “restoration” to an asbestos-free state.)
Taxpayers will instead simply structure the transaction
differently.
In Scenario B the bank holding company instead of
remodeling removes asbestos from the bank building,
reinsulates, and sells it to another. At that point the
asbestos remediation will either be currently deduct-
ible or possibly reduce the gain or increase the loss on
the sale by the bank holding company of the asbestos-
free building. (I understand anecdotally that any finan-
cial institution involved in the purchase would require
asbestos remediation.)164 Then the taxpayer can lease,
buy, or build another bank building at current
reproduction fair market value rates. (This hypotheti-
cal ignores any transaction costs in obtaining another
branch bank permit.) The taxpayer could then have an
ordinary loss for the asbestos remediation under the
restoration principle165 and a new fair market value
basis in the replacement modern bank building.
In scenario C the taxpayer forgoes remodeling the
bank building and instead rewraps or encapsulates the
asbestos insulation as needed in the future (and never
more than 25 percent at a time).166 While this approach
perhaps best fits the clear reflection of income man-
date, it probably is the more contrary to environmental
policies, social policies (a remodeled bank building
hiring local workers might help to stabilize a neighbor-
hood),167 and probably even sound business policies.
V. Cyclical Maintenance Costs
Still another problem arises with some frequency as
to the general plan of rehabilitation. Assume a taxpayer
cyclically repairs or rehabilitates depreciable property
on a cycle shorter than the recovery period under sec-
tion 168 for that property. The expenditure could be
treated alternatively as (a) a current expenditure; (b)
an addition to the basis of the longer-lived depreciable
property and depreciated over that longer recovery
period; or (c) as separate from the larger depreciable
property and depreciated over the recovery period.
A. Current Deduction
The Commissioner inequitably sought in Ingram In-
dustries v. Commissioner168 to capitalize costs recurring
every 31⁄2 years over a 10-year recovery period under
section 168.169 Without discussing the general plan of
163Boris I. Bittker, “Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Con-
struction of the Internal Revenue Code,” 21 How. L.J. 693
(1978); Saul Levmore, “Recharacterizations and the Nature of
Theory in Corporate Tax Law,” 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1019 (1988).
164I am grateful to Anne-Marie Miles for Scenarios A, B,
and C, and for this anecdotal evidence learned from her
father, an attorney working in environmental law.
165See note 166 infra.
166These are essentially the facts in TAM 9411002, 94 TNT
54-13, which allowed a current deduction for such encapsula-
tion of 25 percent of the pipes in taxpayer ’s warehouse, but
required capitalization of the costs of abatement by removing
asbestos-containing materials from taxpayer ’s boiler house,
which was treated for depreciation purposes together with
the warehouse as a single asset. The ruling held that
[u]nlike the costs incurred for asbestos removal in the
taxpayer ’s boiler house, the costs incurred by the tax-
payer for encapsulation of damaged insulation in its
warehouse neither appreciably increased the value of
(Footnote 166 continued in next column.)
the taxpayer ’s property nor substantially prolonged its
useful life. . . . [t]he taxpayer ’s encapsulation expendi-
tures did not increase the value or prolong the useful
life of the taxpayers property beyond what it was
before the asbestos became damaged. The application
of a canvas or plastic wrapping over damaged pipe
insulation reduced, but did not eliminate, the threat of
exposure to airborne asbestos fibers. Moreover, be-
cause of the continued presence of asbestos, the expen-
diture did not enable the taxpayer to operate on a
changed, more efficient, or larger scale. Accordingly,
the taxpayer ’s encapsulation expenditures did not
materially enhance the value of the taxpayer’s proper-
ty, substantially prolong its life, or adapt such property
to a new or different use. Moreover, the effects of the
encapsulation on taxpayer ’s property are temporary.
167Cf. Olivera Perkins, “8th District Hopefuls Focus on
Improving Schools,” The Plain Dealer B-6 (Apr. 5, 1998); “Pres.
Clinton Delivers Remarks on the Environment in Kalamazoo,
Mi,” 1996 Presidential Campaign Press Materials (Aug. 28, 1996)
(“The most important thing that I am working on with the
mayors of America today is cleaning up these brownfields so
we can create jobs in the city. Again, I tell you, good environ-
mental policy is good for the economy. It creates jobs. It
creates a future for America and we have to be prepared to
do it.”).
168Note 49 supra.
169“For  Federal  incom e tax purposes ,  pet i t ioners
depreciate each of their towboats as a single asset under the
modified accelerated cost recovery system using the
prescribed recovery period of 10 years under the composite
18-year  class li fe .  For financial reporting purposes,
petitioners depreciate a new or used towboat as a single asset
over 35 years.” Ingram Indus.  A vessel, barge, tug, or similar
water transportation equipment has a recovery period of 10
years under asset class 00.28 of Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B.
687. See generally Market Segment Specialization Program,
“The Port Project, Training” 3149-123 (Oct. 1995), Doc 95-9557
(130 pages), 95 TNT 205-12. I thank Professor Gene Seago for
putting me on the trail to rules here that are not transparent
in section 168.
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rehabilitation doctrine, the court in Ingram Industries,170
in determining whether cyclical maintenance costs (en-
gine “inspection,” replacing 21 percent of the parts, recur-
ring every 31⁄2 years) “materially added to the value of the
property,” the towboat, thought it “significant that
petitioners [that is, taxpayers] perform the procedures at
a time when the engines are completely serviceable and
the purpose of performing the procedures is to keep the
towboat engines in good operating condition. This is in
contrast to the cases relied on by respondent [the Govern-
ment] where the property was not serviceable and had to
be replaced or completely rebuilt or overhauled.”171 As
shown below, materiality of the expenditure and regularly
recurring are proper rough justice, minimum distortion
of income factors, while operable at the time of the ex-
penditure is not. Ingram Industries unfortunately failed to
clearly articulate the clear-reflection-of-income policy un-
derlying capitalization.172
Ingram Industries may have reached the correct result
for reasons other than the still operable test that are
not inconsistent with minimum distortion of income.
The “repair” cycle there was 31⁄2 years rather than 10
years and the Tax Court held that the “repair” cost of
inspecting the towboat engine, which amounted to 17
percent of the cost of a reconditioned unit, was insub-
stantial (“incidental”) compared to the cost of a new
or rebuilt engine.173 (Ingram Industries did not consider
in this context the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine.)174 Current deduction of future benefit costs
does not distort the taxpayer ’s income where those
costs are insubstantial or steady-state recurring.175 The
Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed the concept that the
regularity of expenses with future benefit supports
their current deduction.176
In TAM 9618004177 the Commissioner allowed a cur-
rent deduction for repairs done on a one- to two-year
cycle and costing between $25,000 and $80,000. In con-
trast, this TAM capitalized the costs of “major engine
inspections” of aircraft engines (also called off-wing
inspections since the engines are removed for inspec-
tion) recurring every three to five years and costing
between $90,000 and $120,000 because they were “not
merely incidental and . . . have the effect of adding
materially to the then value of the engine while at the
same time prolonging the engine’s useful life. Further-
more, these expenditures generate significant future
benefits to Taxpayer, not the least of which is the fact
that without them, the FAA would not permit Taxpayer
to continue to operate its aircraft. Finally, in the case
of engines owned by Taxpayer, the major inspection
costs restore exhaustion for which an allowance has
been made.”178 Whi le  Ingram Industries’s four-year
cycle might be considered closer to the two-year cycle
than the five-year cycle in Wolfsen Land & Cattle179 dis-
cussed in Section V.C. below, it is the same as the four-
year cycle for major engine inspections that the TAM
capitalized.
Revenue Ruling 2001-4, the Service’s restatement of
the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine, restates the
still-operable rule in holding the doctrine inapplicable
where “the plan primarily involved repair and main-
tenance items or the work was performed merely to
keep the property in ordinarily efficient operating con-
dition.”180 This extension of Ingram Industries in Reve-
nue Ruling 2001-4 to an eight-year cycle roughly
equivalent to the recovery period under section 168181
clearly exposes, however, the weakness in the reasoning
in Ingram Industries — that the asset was not yet in-
operable. Revenue Ruling 2001-4 permitted current
deduction of a $2 million “heavy maintenance visit”
(consisting of disassembling the aircraft down to the
frame and then lubricating, inspecting, and replacing
minor parts and repainting and repairing the removed
170Note 49 supra ($100,000 cost of inspecting the two en-
gines per towboat not material in comparison to the $800,000
cost for two rebuilt or overhauled engines).
171Id.
172Finally, the parties address the role, if any, that IN-
DOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 117 L. Ed. 2d
226, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992) (INDOPCO) should play in
our consideration of this issue. Respondent references
INDOPCO along with section 1.162-4, Income Tax
Regs., for the following position:
In order to be entitled to a deduction for the engine
overhaul, petitioners must clearly show that it is an
incidental repair that does not appreciably prolong
the property’s useful life, but keeps it in an ordinarily
efficient operating condition. ***
Accordingly, respondent’s use of INDOPCO does not
vary from the standards set forth earlier in this
opinion. There is no unique aspect or requirement in
the Supreme Court’s INDOPCO opinion that pertains
specifical ly to the issue we consider. Likewise,
petitioners confirm that the INDOPCO holding did
nothing to change the standards established by the
pre-INDOPCO body of law that deals with repair and
maintenance expenses. Accordingly, it is not necessary
to analyze further the INDOPCO holding in the context
of this case.
Ingram Indus., note 49 supra. Unfortunately, the Service
apparently did not argue that INDOPCO required that clear
reflection of income and future benefits should be taken into
account as, for example, in Wolfsen Land & Cattle, note 61
supra.
173Ingram Industries, note 49 supra.
174Burgess J.W. Raby and William L. Raby, “When Push
Comes to Shove on Engine Maintenance Expenses,” Tax
Notes, Oct. 30, 2000, p. 655 at 658.
175See notes 101 and 103 supra; Lee, Start-Up Costs, note 27
supra at 15-20; Lee, Capitalization Rules, note 36 supra at 679-
80; Lee, et al., Rough Justice II, note 5 supra at 1523-48.
176U.S. Freightways Corp., note 5 supra.
177Doc 96-13304 (14 pages), 96 TNT 89-13.
178Id.; see generally Lee, Walberg, and Whitesell, Cyclical
Aircraft Maintenance Costs, note 39 supra at 163-4, 202-03,
and 210-12.
179Wolfsen Land & Cattle, note 61 supra at 18 (called for
treatment of recurring costs of maintaining irrigation system
as freestanding amortizable intangibles with “appropriate
useful lives, i.e., 5 years for field checks, 10 years for ditches,
and 30 years for large levees and canals,” corresponding with
the dredging cycle necessary to avoid complete dysfunction.
Id. at 8).
180Note 1 supra at 298.
181Section 168(e)(3)(C).
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components, but not materially upgrading or adding
to the airframe or any substantial structural part) yield-
ing future benefits for eight years as in the ruling surely
distorts the taxpayer ’s income. In Revenue Ruling
2001-4 the cost, while perhaps not substantial in com-
parison to the original cost of the aircraft,182 13.3 per-
cent of the original cost 15 years earlier, was so large
per se183 ($2 million) that it hardly appears insubstan-
tial.184
Revenue Ruling 2001-4 contained two other fact pat-
terns: (2) in addition to the heavy maintenance visit,
all of the skin panels on the fuselage were replaced,
which materially added to the value of the aircraft (in
addition new cabin fire and smoke detection and sup-
pression system, ground proximity warning, and air
phone system were installed), and (3) similarly many
structural, exterior, and interior modifications were
made, for example, new belly skin panels, metal sup-
ports under the lavatories and galleys, new wiring sys-
tems in the wings, replacing frame rivets, upgrading
cockpit avionics and equipment, replacing all seats,
windows, and carpeting, and installing new cabin fire
and smoke detection and suppression system, ground
proximity warning, and air phone system; all of this
materially increased the value of the airframe and sub-
stantially prolonged its life. The ruling concluded that
the replacement of skin panels and installation of new
systems in (2) had to be capitalized, but the costs of the
heavy maintenance visit were still currently deductible
because all of the expenditures did not rehabilitate the
entire aircraft “restoring it to a ‘like new’ condition.”
In the third scenario, “the effect of all the work per-
formed on aircraft 3, including the inspection, repair,
and maintenance items, is to materially increase the
value of the airframe and substantially prolong its use-
ful life.”185 Thus the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine applied. Clearly the rule of tax parity would
require capitalization of all of the expenditures as to
the third aircraft and under Moss the doctrine would
not apply (as to the replacement of the skin panels and
installation of new systems). However, the amount of
the expenditure and long intervals between the repair
cycles suggest that the expenditures still should be
capitalized.
I understand informally that few heavy main-
tenance visit repairs fall into the first category. Never-
theless, a refund suit filed by FedEx disclosed that after
the ruling the Service conceded the deductibility of the
airframe heavy maintenance visits, but still disallowed
current deduction of off-wing engine inspections.186 As
a practical matter, the Service has advised area counsel
to guide examiners to focus only on the third or later
heavy maintenance visit as to a particular aircraft.187
B. Depreciation Over Longer Recovery Period
The Service in TAM 9618004188 capitalized the
shorter-term recurring maintenance costs (four-year
cycle) that extended the life of aircraft engines and
aluminum reduction cells, respectively, over the longer
71⁄2-year recovery period under section 168 for the
rehabilitated asset, producing in my opinion distortion
of income. Such depreciation over a longer period than
the benefit of the expenditure distorts the taxpayer ’s
income. Treating the cost as a freestanding asset
depreciable over four years in the case of the aircraft
engine maintenance in TAM 9618004, or three to four
years in the case of engine inspections in Ingram Indus.,
discussed above,189 on a straight-line basis under sec-
tion 167 minimizes the income distortion that occurs
by (a) depreciating the maintenance as a reconditioned
182The heavy maintenance costs as to the airframe
amounted to $2 million in comparison to the $15 million ac-
quisition cost or 13.3 percent. Rev. Rul. 2001-4, note 1 supra at
296. In Ingram Indus. the comparable percentage was 1.6 per-
cent, but the Tax Court correctly thought that the “more tell-
ing” comparison was between the costs at issue and the cost
of a completely overhauled engine, or 17 percent. Revenue
Ruling 2001-4 followed the Ingram Indus. approach of treating
cyclical expenditures as merely keeping the asset in ordinarily
efficient operating condition over its anticipated useful life
and thus “did not include the type of substantial capital im-
provements necessary to trigger the plan of rehabilitation
doctrine.” Rev. Rul 2001-4, note 1 supra at 299.
183Section 42 defines “substantial rehabilitation” as at least
10 percent of unadjusted cost. Fifty percent clearly is substan-
tial. “IRS Releases MSSP Audit Guide to Grain Farmers,” Doc
95-10876 (279 pages), 95 TNT 237-21.
184Compare Wolfsen Land & Cattle and TAM 9424002, 94 TNT
118-12, with Rev. Rul. 2001-4 and TAM 9315004, note 74 supra;
see generally Lee, et al., Rough Justice II, note 5 supra at 1527
n. 179.
185Rev. Rul. 2001-4.
186“FedEx Argues Off-Wing Maintenance of Engines Is Or-
dinary Business Expense,” Doc 2001-12228 (25 original pages),
2001 TNT 98-85; see also Petition of CNF Transportation Inc. v.
Commissioner (June 27, 2000), Doc 2000-19093 (64 original
pages), 2000 TNT 151-23 (deductibility of payments to third
party for periodic inspection and maintenance of taxpayer ’s
commercial aircraft amounting to $29 million and $54 million
in 1989 and 1990, respectively).
187FSA 200202026, note 1 supra.
188Note 177 supra; see generally Lee, Walberg, and Whitesell,
Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs, note 39 supra at 202-04;
Pavano, note 24 supra at 279 (argues that the Service’s con-
clusion that cyclical maintenance gives the engine four more
years of operational life is erroneous); Clancy, note 60 supra
at 559 (same), 561 (applies restoration principle), 568 (reads
Norwest Corp. as not limiting general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine to assets not in operative condition as dicta), and 572
(adopts notion that better matching is with past income
rather than future income). See also Deborah A. Geier, “The
Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax Value,” 15 Am. J. Tax
Pol’y 17, 42-5 (1998) (future benefit expenses generally should
not be currently deductible under income tax system because
such treatment is the hallmark of a consumption tax regime);
Coolidge, note 127 supra at 790 (“The matching principle
remains a restricted proposition — it only reaches income
generated by a business’s expenses. It guards the line be-
tween costs that affect present income and those that affect
future income. Current costs cannot, in any world, produce
past income. . . . [The prior] pollution may have produced the
need for the current cleanup expenses, but the expenses
themselves remained a later choice within [an entity’s] dis-
cretion.”).
189See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
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engine purchase under section 168 over 10 years,190 or
(b) currently deducting the cost. Alternatively, if the
recurrence period is short enough and the expenditure
relatively small enough, under a balancing test a cur-
rent deduction could be appropriate. But these factors
should be expressly relied on rather than an overly
broad “still in operating condition” rubric as in Ingram
Indus.
In Moss v. Commissioner191 the Service sought to cap-
italize the expenditures for repainting and wallpaper-
ing motel rooms, which were done on a two- to three-
year cycle, to the cost of the motel building, itself
recoverable then over an almost 30-year period, while
the capitalized costs of longer-lived beds and furniture
were recoverable over a 71⁄2-year period using a front-
loaded accelerated depreciation rate.192 The review
court in Moss likely was pushed in part toward its
current deduction holding by the Service’s inequitably
seeking capitalization and recovery over a much longer
period than the repair cycle. Before INDOPCO,  a
similar inequitable Service litigating posture lead some
courts (and Congress at times in committee reports)193
to favor the, since discredited by INDOPCO, creation
of a separate asset prerequisite to capitalization.194 The
Fourth Circuit described the Commissioner ’s position
in one of the bank credit card expansion costs taxpayer
victories decided under that rubric as “an attempted
overreaching by the tax collector. If he failed, he had
less basis for protest than if he had confined his
demands to those which were properly Caesar’s”).195
C. Depreciation as a Freestanding Intangible 
In Wolfsen Land & Cattle v. Commissioner,196 the tax-
payer incurred substantial costs in dredging irrigation
ditches every 10 years when it became dysfunctional
in lieu of performing annual maintenance. The parties
presented the court with two income-distorting op-
tions: either allow a current deduction of the substan-
tial costs or capitalize the costs to the nondepreciable
basis of the land with an indefinite useful life. Wolfsen
Land & Cattle properly viewed both of the opposing
choices — currently deducting (in the 10th year) or
capitalizing the costs to the irrigation system, which
was nondepreciable since it was of indefinite life — as
distorting the taxpayer ’s income.
[W]e are faced with something of a conundrum,
how do we treat a maintenance-type expense sub-
stantial in amount, which only restores its subject
to its original operating condition, yet need be
repeated only on the average of every 10 years
and is performed on a subject of indefinite life.
To permit a current deduction of such a large
expenditure with a beneficial effect lasting on the
average of 10 years would surely distort that
year ’s income. Yet to deny even an amortization
deduction for an expenditure with a specific dem-
onstrable beneficial life on the grounds that its
deductibility is contaminated by its relationship
to an asset of indefinite life, i.e., the land, would
similarly require an uneven reporting of in-
come.197
The Tax Court resolved this conundrum and effected
clear reflection of income by giving “independent
status to those expenditures on the basis that they
create a free-standing intangible asset with an amor-
tizable 10-year life.”198 (Similarly gates in the irrigation
system that were replaced every 5 years were held
depreciable over a 5-year period.) True, in Wolfsen Land
& Cattle the “repaired” asset was almost dysfunctional
while in Ingram Industries it was not; however, had the
taxpayer in Wolfsen Land & Cattle carried out the re-
dredging in the ninth year when the irrigation ditch
was not yet dysfunctional,199 the Ingram Industries test
would have been met, but under Wolfsen Land & Cattle
distortion of income still would have resulted from
currently deducting a expenditure with a nine-year
future benefit. An even more striking example is TAM
9424002200 where offshore pumping stations were
originally 30 meters above sea level and after sub-
sidence of three meters (first detected in 1977, con-
firmed in 1984) were raised 6 meters at a cost of $471
million (completed in 1987). If the subsidence had been
corrected (back to 30 meters) while the pumping sta-
tions were still operable (say in 1977 or when sub-
sidence was only 2 meters), under Ingram Indus. the
huge expenditure would be currently deductible. The
substantial tax savings from a current deduction could
190Section 168(c).
191Note 18 supra at 839-40.
192Sections 168(c) and (d)(1) and (4)(A); Lee, Capitalization
Rules, note 36 supra at 677-78.
193H.R. Rep. No. 96-1278, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), S.
Rep. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 and n. 38 (1986); H.
R. Rep. No. 103-66, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 760-61 (1993) (dis-
cussions as to costs of self-created intangible assets being
deductible under current law implicitly relying on separate
asset prerequisite to capitalization). This legislative history,
being long subsequent to enactment of section 162 and its
predecessors, cannot control a doctrine based on section 162
under the rubric that “the views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one.” United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 33 n.14 (1982); Sierra
Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526, 1534, Doc 96-18450
(24 pages), 96 TNT 124-13 (9th Cir. 1996).
194Lee, Start-Up Costs, note 27 supra at 9-10; Lee, et al.,
Rough Justice I, note 5 supra at 638-42 and n. 18 (Service
authorities reluctantly adopted separate asset doctrine). This
subsequent legislative history should not broaden deduct-
ibility of business expansion costs under section 162, see note
193 supra, despite the arguments of many. E.g., “Comments
of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. on Notice 96-7 Request for
Comments on Further Capitalization Guidance Submitted to
the Internal Revenue Service March 20, 1996,” Doc 96-9048
(23 pages), 96 TNT 60-19, paras. 39, 42.
195NCNB I, note 100 supra at 959-60.
196Note 61 supra at 8.
197Id. at 26-7.
198Id. at 27.
199The canals in question only became dysfunctional at the
end of 10 years when the hydraulic capacity of the ditches
became so reduced that they could no longer irrigate the
fields. Id. at 15, 25.
200Note 184 supra.
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offset the additional economic costs of repeating the
raising earlier this time and the next time.
In Vanalco, Inc. v. Commissioner201 the government
and the taxpayer “stipulated” that cell linings of
aluminum reduction cells have an average useful life
of three years. The Tax Court held that the cost of
removing and replacing the exhausted cell lining was
around $23,000, or about 22 percent of the cost of the
rehabilitated reduction cell. “Thus, the cell lining has
a life that is independent of the cell unit as a whole.”202
The Tax Court found “that replacing the cell linings
cannot be classified as an incidental repair, and the cost
must therefore be capitalized.”203 Presumably the Ser-
vice and the Tax Court allowed recovery of the annual
costs of replacing cell linings (which were quite sub-
stantial in the aggregate)204 over that three-year period.
The technical problem is that section 198 does not work
that way; it prohibits composite depreciation and ap-
parently even if the cell lining were treated as a sepa-
rate asset would place it into the catch-all seven-year
recovery period category.205 The more conceptually ac-
curate approach would be to treat the cell-lining re-
placement cost as a freestanding amortizable intan-
gible, depreciable straight-line over a three-year
period.
The common sense freestanding depreciable intan-
gible solution is equally applicable to cyclical engine
maintenance and the re-bricking of the aluminum
reduction cell costs. Unfortunately, the Service to date
generally has refused to adopt the depreciation of a
freestanding intangible asset approach to recurring
costs.206 Consequently, it often strains to find an ap-
propriate depreciable asset that could have the recur-
ring costs tied to it. For example, in the case of em-
ployee training costs, the Service initially permitted
depreciation of capitalized new nuclear power plant
employee training costs over the life of the building in
which the workforce was employed.207 C on tem-
poraneously, the Service capitalized training costs as
start-up costs of a new plant in an existing lumber
business as a depreciable intangible asset — “an opera-
tional fiberboard plant.”208 Subsequently, during the
period the Service followed the separate asset doctrine,
it allowed a current deduction for the costs of training
a work force in connection with the establishment of a
new manufacturing facility by a taxpayer with similar
existing operational plants in other locations.209 Later,
the Service amortized employee training costs over the
life of a plant’s 40-year Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion license.210 The PCP remediation cost TAM similar-
ly capitalized the soil remediation costs to the tax-
payer ’s natural gas piping, its chief operating asset.211
This awkward progression strongly indicates that the
Service should recognize generally the approach of
capitalizing costs as freestanding assets depreciated
over their own useful lives,212 rather than fudging in
litigation by stipulating to the recurrence cycle as the
useful life of the replacement without regard to section
168. (How is this “stipulation” approach applicable to
other taxpayers?) Otherwise as in Moss it runs the risk
that a court may find a current deduction less income
distorting than overly long depreciation.213 This may
have underlain in part the result in Ingram Indus. In
Revenue Ruling 2001-4 the Service itself appears to
have given up the fight and allowed a current deduc-
tion of substantial costs benefitting an eight-year
period.214 Administratively, Examination is going even
further and simply allowing the costs of the first two
heavy maintenance visits to be currently deductible.215
VI. Conclusion
The article reveals that all of the recent authorities
considering cyclical expenses or toxic substance
remediation, to which the general plan of rehabilitation
doctrine has been applied at least sporadically,216 are
at least partially incorrect in reasoning or result, creat-
ing distortion of the taxpayer ’s income. For instance,
the Tax Court in Ingram Indus. conceptualized expen-
ditures recurring every 3 years as maintaining a 40-
year asset by maintenance at 3-year intervals.
The toxic materials remediation cases are equally
irreconcilable and wrong (for different reasons). Nor-
west Corp. appears to have applied the Plainfield Union
restoration principle by comparing the value of the
remediated property after clean-up with the value
before the toxicity was discovered (but incorrectly ap-
plied the general plan of rehabilitation by violating the
reverse rule of parity basis for the latter doctrine). In
contrast United Dairy Farmers did not so apply the res-
201Note 1 supra (The Ninth Circuit in affirming the Tax
Court on this issue did not discuss the general plan of
rehabilitation yet it did as to another issue).
202Id.
203Id.
204Vanalco reported a repair expense of $4.4 million for
replacing 206 cell linings in 1992 and $4.2 million for the cost
of replacing 192 cells in 1993. Brief for Appellee, Vanalco, Inc.
v. Commissioner, On Appeal to the Ninth Circuit (Nov. 14,
2001), Doc 2001-29480 (52 original pages), 2001 TNT 241-24,
para. 15.
205Section 168(e)(3)(C)(2).
206But cf. TAM 9424002, note 184 supra (using the period
of recurrence as the useful life to depreciate the costs incurred
to raise a sinking seawall).
207See TAM 7509099440A (Sept. 9, 1975).
208See TAM 7504281070A (Apr. 28, 1975); cf. GCM 37,500
(Apr. 5, 1978) (suggesting, but not ruling, that pre-opening
costs like training should be capitalized and amortized over
the life of the facility).
209See TAM 8303012 (Oct. 7, 1982), modifying TAM 8204061
(Oct. 28, 1981).
210See TAM 9430003, 94 TNT 149-31 (Apr. 22, 1994).
211See note 111 supra.
212Lee, Walberg, and Whitesell, Cyclical Aircraft Main-
tenance Costs, note 39 supra at 205, 215-19.
213Lee, Capitalization Rules, note 36 supra at 677.
214The Service is reported to have negotiated an industry-
wide resolution of aircraft maintenance costs with the airline
industry. Amy Hamilton, “IRS Negotiating Resolution of IN-
DOPCO-type Issues With Two Industries,” Tax Notes, Feb. 5,
2001, p. 728.
215See note 187 supra and accompanying text.
216Compare Vanalco with Ingram Indus. and Rev. Rul. 2001-4.
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toration principle, overlooking the acquisition cost
doctrine, which would turn on whether the remedia-
tion was anticipated at the time of purchase.
The fundamental error in all cases was reliance on
tests, or better talismans,217 all originating before the
development of determining capitalization versus a
current deduction on the basis of which would produce
less or no distortion of income. Had the courts and the
Service considered these capitalization versus expensing/
repair versus improvement cases in light of minimum
distortion of income (for example, substantial future
benefits mandates capitalization unless the benefit is
relatively short term or depreciation is unavailable or
the recovery period extends over a period substantially
longer than the period benefited) and realized that the
general plan of rehabilitation doctrine is but a manifes-
tation of the policy that neither a taxpayer purchasing
nor a taxpayer creating or enhancing her asset should
be tax advantaged or disadvantaged compared to the
other, this Serbonian Bog of conflicting, erroneous au-
thorities would not have been created. The guidance
as to repair costs now under consideration offers a
perfect opportunity to drain this Serbonian Bog and
not fix it in concrete.
217Courts use “talisman” as metaphor for a “magical
power” that wards off the scrutiny of the trier of fact, blinding
her to other relevant factors and, thus, dictates the tax conse-
quences of the transaction. In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Winters, 174 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir.
1999); Smith v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1995). See
generally Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284-85
(1960).
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